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Foreword
The distribution of wealth and income, of opportunity and political power each have
a long intellectual history. Since the Great Recession of 2008, the debate concern-
ing these issues has intensified as scholars of all backgrounds strive to offer accounts
of the causes and consequences of the unequal distribution of political and economic
outcomes and opportunities. Economists participate in this debate and have provided
fruitful analyses. On the one hand, scholars like Piketty (2014), Piketty and Zucman
(2014) and Alvaredo et al. (2013) have shed light on the growing concentration of
wealth at the top of the income distribution and have focused attention on the role
that factors such as the returns to capital, the decline of top marginal tax rates and the
decline in the bargaining power of labour play in explaining the dynamics of wealth
and income inequality. On the other hand, scholars such as Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2015), Autor (2014) and Goldin and Katz (2009) offer explanations that centre
more on factors such as skills and education, the endogenous evolution of technol-
ogy and political institutions which do so much to shape how markets function and
how their outcomes are distributed. In this respect, a number of economists have ex-
plored the dynamic interaction between political and economic forces in explaining
inequality. Their work highlights the importance that such factors as the extension
of suffrage, voter participation and political representation play in shaping political
and economic outcomes (Cascio and Washington, 2014; Miller, 2008; Fujiwara, 2015;
Pande, 2003). The overarching goal of this dissertation is to contribute to this litera-
ture by highlighting the economic and political impact of political participation. The
question that unites the chapters in this volume is as follows: what happens to the
distribution of political power and economic resources when ordinary citizens par-
ticipate more fully in the affairs of society? Although the chapters are not theoretical
in nature, the empirical analysis in each does rely on economic theory so as to shed
light on the underlying mechanisms at work. In Chapter 1, participation is measured
by rates of turnout in federal elections across the OECD countries while in Chapters
2 and 3, participation is measured through a natural experiment that legalised, and
eventually enfranchised, a large number of Hispanic migrants in the United States in
ix
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the 1980s. The results in all three indicate that greater participation of people in the
political process leads to significant increases in the distribution of economic resources
as well as in political representation.
What follows is an overview of each of the chapters. Each chapter is self-contained
and, as such, can be read independently. A consolidated bibliography is presented at
the end of the work.
In Chapter 1, I test the predictions of the median voter theorem, which main-
tains that politicians, in an effort to stay in power, offer policy platforms that cater to
the policy preferences of the person in the median of the voting distribution. I was
motivated by the observation that turnout in major federal elections in many stable
democracies has fallen drastically in recent decades. Because this decrease is strongly
correlated with income, the pivotal voter is no longer the one whose income lies at the
median of the overall income distribution but instead the one whose income lies at
the median of a much richer subset of it. I therefore assemble a panel of the 34 OECD
countries for the period between 1974 and 2014 in order to test the impact of voter
turnout on the size of government, using top marginal tax rates as a key outcome
variable. Across a number of specifications, I find that voter turnout does indeed
have a positive and statistically significant effect on top tax rates. A limitation, how-
ever, of large, cross-sectional studies like this is that sharp identification, from which
causal inference can be made, is difficult. Yet, the results of the paper seem to sug-
gest more than just a spurious correlation. The results across a number of different
specifications, including an instrumental variables strategy, all point in the same di-
rection: that greater turnout has a positive effect on government redistributive policy.
I conclude the paper by suggesting that the results of the study, far from casting doubt
on the nature of the relationship, call out for further research, perhaps using micro-
data in order to benefit from sharper identification strategies. Chapters 2 and 3 are a
response to that call.
In Chapter 2, which is joint work with Christoph Winter, we ask what hap-
pens to the distribution of public resources when undocumented migrants obtain le-
gal status, and eventually citizenship and the right to vote, through a nation-wide
amnesty. Our analysis is motivated by a model of distributive politics in which in-
cumbent politicians respond to changes in the electorate by adjusting their budget
allocations to target the preferences of the newly enfranchised group so as to optimise
(a) the welfare of the population and (b) their own re-election chances. Accordingly,
we posit that incumbent politicians will allocate resources strategically to those coun-
ties most affected by amnesty in an effort to win the political support of the newly
legalised migrants. We test this model by exploiting the 1986 Immigration Reform
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and Control Act (IRCA) in the United States. The IRCA legalised some 3 million
undocumented migrants, mostly of Hispanic origin, and offered them a path to cit-
izenship five years after legalisation. Utilising a difference-in-differences regression
framework, we find that state governments allocate more per capita resources to those
counties with a greater share of IRCA documented migrants. Probing further, we find
that this allocation is sensitive to the political context of the state governor: counties
affected by the IRCA receive more resources from the state when their governor is
eligible for re-election, faces political competition, enjoys line-item veto power or is
politically aligned with the state legislature. Aggregating the variables of interest to
the state level, we find that an incumbent governor’s chances for re-election improve
as the share of newly documented migrants in a state increases, further highlighting
the political economy nature of our results. Given that undocumented migration is
a politically and socially charged issue, we end the paper by trying to shed light on
whether the allocation of resources to IRCA-affected counties is indeed intended to
reach the newly documented migrants in an effort to win their vote or to satisfy other,
perhaps competing, constituents. To this end, we exploit survey data as well as vot-
ing data on a key anti-migrant ballot measure and find no evidence that anti-migrant
sentiment is confounding our results. Finally, we find that local expenditure in ed-
ucation increases in the share of newly documented migrants in a county. Hispanic
individuals, as opposed to Caucasian ones, who reside in counties affected by the
IRCA and who entered middle school after 1986 experience significant improvements
in the likelihood of completing high school, suggesting that the additional resources
were in fact intended to target the newly legalised migrants. On the whole, the results
of the paper suggest that the relationship between legal status and the distribution of
public resources is one of discretionary political choice rather than one of economic
necessity or mechanical welfare increases.
Chapter 3 is, in many ways, a follow up to Chapter 2. Here, I test another po-
tential channel through which Hispanic legalisation, and eventual enfranchisement,
could have affected economic and political outcomes: political representation. In this
case, the analysis is guided by models of political selection which posit that candidates
of political office are selected primarily on account of their ability to enact policy. If
policy competence, however, is concentrated among a certain group or class of peo-
ple, then the electorate, according to these models, will opt for less able candidates in
favour of greater representation. Although some empirical work has shown that the
competence-representation duality does not always exist, when the interests of groups
are far apart or when competence is unevenly distributed, it is not clear to what ex-
tent competence or representation will drive political selection. In a setting such as
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the United States in 1986, the three million Hispanic migrants affected by the IRCA
systematically differ in their socio-economic characteristics to the rest of the popula-
tion. Accordingly, I hypothesize that their legalisation and eventual enfranchisement
will lead to increases in the number of Hispanic individuals elected to public office
and it will do so on account of the ability of these officials to better represent His-
panic interests. To test this potential explanation, I digitised a novel source of data
that contains information on Hispanic persons elected to public office in the United
States from the local to the federal level from 1984 to 1994 and compare the number
of such officials in counties more affected by the IRCA with those in counties less af-
fected by the IRCA both before and after 1986. I find that counties with a greater share
of newly documented migrants also experienced significant increases in the number
of Hispanic persons holding political office who also reside in that county. The timing
of the effect suggests that it is indeed the voting potential of the IRCA migrants that
is driving the result: the number of Hispanic elected officials at all levels—local, state
and federal—increases in counties affected by the IRCA only as of 1992, the first year
when the newly documented migrants could vote. Decomposing the data further re-
veals that the result is driven almost entirely by stronger representation at the local
level, in particular by members of local school boards and by mayors of small cities,
offices where, arguably, community representation matters more than policy-making
expertise. By contrast, I find no effect whatsoever for Hispanic elected judges at either
the state or local level. These last two findings lead me to conclude that the Hispan-
ics that are selected to public office as a result of the IRCA are selected not strictly
on account of their educational qualifications and professional credentials but rather
for their ability to better represent Hispanic interests on local matters pertaining to
schooling and education.
Chapter 1
Turning Out for Redistribution: The Effect of Voter
Turnout on Top Marginal Tax Rates
1.1. Introduction
On a single day in May 2012, some 100,000 people gathered in New York City1 to
protest the exorbitant rise in the share of incomes accruing to the top 1 percent of the
income distribution in the United States. In that country, the pre-tax income share of
the wealthiest 1 percent has increased from 11 percent in 1978 to some 20 percent in
2015 even as the income share of the bottom 50 percent has collapsed from 20 to 12
percent over the same time period (Alvaredo et al., 2017). Around the world, trends
are similar. As of 2014, the richest percentile of the global population claimed 48 per-
cent of the world’s wealth (Oxfam, 2015). As such, the ‘May Day’ protest in New
York City was organised as part of the larger Occupy movement which “aims to fight
back against the richest 1 percent of people that are writing the rules of an unfair
global economy.”2 The movement spanned some 100 cities in the United States and
approximately 1,500 others across the globe. And yet, in November of that same year,
just 53.5 percent of the total voting age population turned out to vote in America’s
presidential election. Ironically, individuals with incomes over US$100,000 comprised
more than 25 percent of the vote.3 More generally, across all OECD countries, those
that held elections between 2010 and 2014 experienced an average turnout of 66 per-
1Estimates taken from the David Graeber’s 7 May 2012 article in the Guardian: http :
//bit.ly/2ttRH7L. Accessed September 2016.
2Taken from the Website of the Occupy Wall Street: http://occupywallst.org/about/. Accessed
September 2016.
3Authors own calculations using Table 7 of the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey,
November 2012. Those with incomes of more than $100,000 per annum make up 26.5 percent of the
registered voting population.
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cent, 12 percentage points lower than the 1974–1979 average of 78 percent.4 Although
this evidence need not be contradictory—it could be, for example, that the protesters
were mostly well-to-do voters whereas low income individuals neither voted nor
protested—the contrasts are stark and they stimulate questions worthy study: for in-
stance, if so many are concerned about the distribution of wealth and if so many are
committed to taking action for the cause, then why do so few people vote? And what
are the economic consequences of such low rates of turnout? Are they, in any way,
responsible for the growing concentration of wealth among the top percentile?
In this chapter, I analyse the latter two of these questions. I examine the impact
of voter turnout on top marginal tax rates in the Organisation for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) countries. Empirical studies have shown that those
who vote are systematically different in their social and economic characteristics—and
hence their policy preferences—to those who do not vote. A large body of scholarship
indicates that, among other things, those who vote tend to be richer, better educated
and older than those who do not. Falling rates of voter turnout, therefore, imply that
the preferences of wealthy individuals are over-represented in relation to those of the
population in general which, I expect, will place less pressure on public policy for
redistribution. Accordingly, I anticipate top marginal tax rates to rise and fall with
turnout.
To test this hypothesis, I assemble a panel of data for the OECD countries for
the period between 1974 and 2014 to assess the impact of voter turnout in national
elections on top marginal tax rates. I find a positive and statistically significant rela-
tionship between the two. Results across a number of specifications indicate that a
ten percentage point increase in voter turnout leads to approximately 2.5 percentage
point increase in the top marginal tax rate. If the correlations uncovered in this chap-
ter are causal, then the 12 percentage point decrease in voter turnout in the 40 years to
2014 can explain some 13 percent of the 23 percentage point decline in tax rates over
the same period. Because both variables are downward-sloping time series, I under-
take a number of empirical strategies to regress them against each other in order to
determine whether their relationship is, in fact, causal.
As a first step, I control for a number of observable social and economic char-
acteristics of the countries in question, including per capita gross domestic product,
annual growth in GDP, educational attainment, whether the election is presidential or
parliamentary and the population size of a given country in a given year. To address
concerns that deeper, underlying characteristics such as political freedoms are driving
4Turnout expressed as a fraction of the total voting age population (VAP) The difference between
turnout and VAP turnout will be discussed later in the paper.
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the results, I include indices from Freedom House that measure the degree of political
and civil rights. Controlling for these observable characteristics does little to diminish
the effect of voter turnout on top marginal tax rates. The results remain positive and
statistically significant at conventional levels.
As a second strategy, I exploit the panel structure of the data by including year
dummies and country fixed effects. This is a crucial step as it enables me to (a) study
the within-country variation of the variables of interest and (b) account for all unob-
servable, time-invariant country heterogeneity. It also allows me to control for any
additional unobservable effects that vary over time but that remain constant across
countries such as shocks to the global economy. Encouragingly, I find that my results
remain robust to the inclusion of both year dummies and country fixed effects.
To increase confidence in the OLS estimates, I re-run the regressions on various
subsamples. First, I regress the top marginal tax rate in years t + 1, t + 2 and t + 3
as well as over the election cycle on voter turnout for elections in year t and I find
significant results, implying that turnout has an impact not just in the election year
but throughout the entire term of a given government. Second, I carry out a placebo
test by regressing tax rates in years t− 1, t− 2 and t− 3 on voter turnout for elections
in year t. If turnout is what causes changes in tax rates, then we would not expect to
see significant effects of turnout in year t on tax rates in years t− n. Consistent with
this thinking, I find that turnout has little to no explanatory power over top marginal
tax rates in the years leading up to an election.
As a final step, I employ an instrumental variables approach to exploit only the
exogenous variation in voter turnout. The instrument I use is an indicator variable for
whether a country has compulsory voting laws, arguing that the introduction of such
laws influences the top tax rate only and only through its impact on rates of turnout.
The instrumental variables results produce estimates with coefficients of similar mag-
nitude and sign to OLS estimates. However, coefficients are estimated less imprecisely
than OLS and as such, are taken as suggestive.
This study contributes to a rich literature that documents the effect of voter
turnout on economic outcomes. The most well-documented relationship between
turnout and redistribution concerns the effect of voter participation on government
expenditures as a share of GDP. Hicks and Swank (1992) examine the political determi-
nants of social spending in 18 industrialised democracies during the period between
1960 and 1982 and find that higher rates of voter turnout augment welfare spending.
In a similar vein, Lindert (1996) analyses the factors that determine social spending in
a panel of data for 19 OECD countries between 1960 and 1981. His dependent vari-
ables include six measures of government expenditure: pensions, welfare, unemploy-
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ment compensation, education, health and non-social spending. His results indicate
that higher levels of voter turnout are associated with higher levels of social spend-
ing in almost all categories. Examining similar questions with another panel of 19
OECD countries, Franzese (2002) finds that both income skew and voter participation
affect government transfers. Interestingly, his study also finds that the interaction of
these two variables has a positive and significant effect on taxes and transfers, sug-
gesting that voter turnout matters more for government redistribution when income
distribution is more unequal. More recently, Mahler, Jesuit and Paradowski (2014)
assess the impact of voter turnout across 14 advanced democracies. In contrast to
other studies, the authors use a measure for turnout inequality rather than rates of
turnout as the main explanatory variable and find that greater inequality of voting is
associated with less social benefits. Larcinese (2007) carries out a cross-country panel
analysis of 41 countries between 1972 and 1998 and finds a similar relationship be-
tween voter turnout and social and welfare spending. His contribution shows that
the results derived in previous studies hold even when considering countries that are
not “developed democracies”; in so doing he expands the sample and extends previ-
ously documented results to a much wider range of countries. Finally, Fujiwara (2015)
examines the introduction of electronic voting technology in Brasil. He finds that such
technology led to a large increase in voting among lesser educated citizens, thereby
causing a shift in government spending towards health care aimed at lower income
groups.
The study adds to this literature in two ways. First, it adds to studies like Lindert
(1996), Franzese (2002) and Larcinese (2007) by analysing recent data for the OECD
nations over a 40 year period. In this respect, Lindert (1996) explains that “post-1981
data are not available in the abundance and quality of this special OECD study”. The
dataset compiled for this study does not suffer from this difficulty. The number of
countries in the OECD has also grown to 34 since Lindert’s study which expands
the sample considerably. Additionally, because of the panel structure of my data, I
am able to account for any unobserved time and country heterogeneity which might
confound the analysis, a step which has not always been taken in previous work. I
also examine the effects of turnout on tax rates not just in the year of the election but in
subsequent years and over the electoral cycle and I employ an instrumental variables
strategy in an effort to isolate the exogenous variation in turnout.
Second, by investigating the effects of voter turnout on top marginal tax rates,
the study is, to my knowledge, the first of its kind to measure the effects of voter par-
ticipation on policies that directly affect the distribution of income. Thus, while it is
related to the literature that examines the relationship between turnout and redistri-
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bution as measured by the amount of government social spending, the study poses
a slightly different question, asking instead what the direct effects of voter turnout
are on the tax rates of the wealthiest segments of the population. In so doing, the
study relates to the literature that documents the determinants of wealth concentra-
tion, the like of which include the difference between the interest rate and growth rate
(Piketty, 2014; Piketty and Zucman, 2014), the supply and demand of skills and the
overall returns to education (Autor, 2014) and institutional and technological factors
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2015). Although political accounts of inequality exist, these
studies focus mostly on the power and resources of the wealthy in shaping market
outcomes and government public policy (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Winters 2011).
This study thus adds to this scholarship by relating political participation of citizens
in elections with one tax policy intended to respond to the growing concentration of
wealth.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the median
voter theorem and addresses the dual questions of who votes and why. Section 1.3
describes the data and also details the empirical specifications and results. Section 1.4
discusses the results and Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2. Theoretical Motivation
1.2.1 Voter Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem
A tenet of the political science of elections is the median voter theorem. The the-
orem maintains that politicians have but one objective: to win office. Accordingly,
politicians have powerful incentives to align their policy platforms to suit the inter-
ests of the majority of their respective electorates. Consequently, the policy platforms
of competing parties on a left-right policy spectrum gradually converge toward cen-
tre ground so as to maximize the number of votes won and to minimize the number
of votes lost. As early as 1929, Harold Hotelling, observing the competition between
the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States, noted that in order to
avoid losing votes, “each party strives to make its platform as much like the other as
possible” (Hotelling, 1929).
Elaborating the idea, Downs (1957) suggested that politicians “act solely in or-
der to attain the income, prestige and power which come from being in office...” and
that “parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in
order to formulate policies”. To win office, therefore, politicians offer policy platforms
that increasingly draw nearer to the preferences of the voter whose preferences are lo-
cated in the median of the preference distribution. Put more precisely, the Downsian
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Figure 1.1: Tax rates as a function of individual income and productivity
model of electoral competition states that, given a one-dimensional policy space and
single-peaked voter preferences, the policy preferences of the median voter act as a
sort of centripetal force, drawing the policy platforms of various parties towards it.
Meltzer and Richard (1981) build on the Downsian conception of electoral com-
petition to model how governments set tax rates and allocate social spending in re-
sponse to the preferences of the median voter. Their seminal model indicates that the
size of government, taken to be the share of income redistributed by the government
in welfare payments and in social services, depends on the relative distance between
median and mean income. The lower median income is with respect to mean income,
the greater is the demand for redistribution, up to a maximum tax rate. As median in-
come approaches mean income, the preferences of voters for a high tax rate declines.
Politicians maximize their electoral chances by offering a tax rate commensurate with
the preferences of the median voter for redistribution. The insights of their model are
captured in Figure 1.1, where t denotes the tax rate and x denotes individual produc-
tivity endowments.
In their model, individual income, y, is a function of individual productivity,
x. Tax rates are denoted by τ. Utility is a function of consumption and leisure and
consumption, in turn, is a function of net income plus a government benefit, r, as
shown in equation 1.1.
c(x) = (1− τ)xn + r (1.1)
Where n is time allocated to work and 1− n is time allocated for leisure. An
CHAPTER 1. TURNING OUT FOR REDISTRIBUTION 7
individual in a Meltzer and Richard economic environment thus tries to choose n so
as to solve the following utility maximization problem:
max
ne[0,1]
u(c, l) = u[r + nx(1− τ), 1− n] (1.2)
Without specifying a functional form for u(c, l), Meltzer and Richard derive
the following first-order condition, comprised of utility from consumption and utility
from leisure.
∂u
∂n
= uc[r + nx(1− τ), 1− n]x(1− τ)− ul [r + nx(1− τ), 1− n] (1.3)
The model suggests that there exists a certain level of productivity, denoted x0,
at which individuals subsist solely on government transfers and choose not to work.
Setting n = 0 and solving for x in equation 1.3, we derive the threshold level of pro-
ductivity below which individuals subsist on government benefits:
x0 =
uc[r, 1]
ul [r, 1](1− τ) (1.4)
Note that x0 is maximized as τ increases. Consequently, individuals endowed
with productivity x ≤ x0, prefer rates of taxation that maximize government trans-
fers and, hence, individual utility (since utility is a function of government transfers,
r, and productivity, x). If the median voter is endowed with x0, tax rates are set at
a maximum, noted τmax in Figure 1.1. The maximum tax rate has an upper bound,
beyond which overall output and, hence, government revenues decline. As the me-
dian income receiver increases in productivity, his or her preference for government
transfers decreases as does his or her preference for a high tax rate. When the pro-
ductivity of the decisive voter approaches average levels of productivity, x¯, his or her
preference for taxation go to zero as he or she derives full utility from income gener-
ated through work and time dedicated to leisure. Because utility is a function of both
earned income and government benefits, votes for the tax rate are implicit votes for
utility: people less reliant on government benefits prefer lower taxes whereas those
more reliant on them prefer higher taxes. In a majority rule voting system, therefore,
the pivotal voter is the one located at the median of the income distribution.
A more general implication of the model is that the more widely political fran-
chise is extended, the poorer is the median voter in relation to the population aver-
age and the greater are his or her demands for redistribution. The model thus has
trouble explaining rising inequality, especially of the sort generated by the hyper-
concentration of wealth by the top percentiles. After all, such concentration creates
median voters with incomes far below the average and with preferences for greater
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redistribution. If the model holds true, then, we would expect tax rates to rise as
wealth becomes increasingly concentrated. Why haven’t they?
1.2.2 Who Votes?
The shortcomings of the median voter theorem have been well documented elsewhere
(see, for example, Alesina (1988), Lee, Moretti and Butler (2004), or chapter 2 in Hind-
mor (2006)). Here, I focus on the role of turnout. The theorem assumes that everyone
in a population votes, in which case the decisive voter is the voter with median level
income as suggested by Meltzer and Richard. But what happens when not everyone
votes? If voters and non-voters are randomly distributed, then it would be difficult to
identify significant consequences of falling rates of turnout. As it happens, however,
those who vote are typically better educated, wealthier and more informed politically
than those who abstain. From an empirical point of view, then, the ‘median voter’ is
not the one who lies at the median of the income distribution of the population but
rather at the median of a much richer subset of the income distribution. Although
there is some research that challenges the conventional view that voter turnout—and
in particular the decline of it—is marked along class lines (Leighley and Nagler, 1992),
the majority of studies consistently show that factors such as age, income, education
as well as being better informed are strong predictors of individual turnout (Lassen
2005; Smets and van Ham 2013; Gallego 2010). Larcinese (2007) describes the phe-
nomenon aptly:
Downsian models normally assume that everybody votes. . . It is, however,
clear from available data that non-voters are not randomly distributed
across the total population: a substantial body of empirical research has
documented that voters and non-voters systematically differ in their socio-
economic and demographic background and, therefore, in their needs and
policy preferences. . . In different countries and elections, empirical research
consistently shows that the likelihood of voting is positively correlated
with income, age and education level, as well as with being a male citi-
zen. It is quite likely that such characteristics are correlated with policy
preference, especially over issues of redistribution.
A cursory search of readily available evidence confirms this view. Figure 1.2
shows voter turnout by household income for the last three presidential elections in
the United States. As shown, there is a clear association between income and turnout.
Figure 1.3 shows the same data, this time for the 2014 presidential election and broken
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Figure 1.2: Turnout by household income in US presidential elections
Source: US Census Bureau Current Population Survey (Tables 7 for 2012 and 2014 and Table 8 for 2008)
Table 1.1: Turnout by income group in 1995 French presidential elections
Turnout (%) by Income Group
Lowest Low Middle High Highest Total N
Did not vote 17.6 16.3 9.6 8.4 7.9 11.1 101
Voted 82.4 83.7 90.4 91.6 92.4 88.9 810
N 102 106 230 274 139 911
Source: Abrial, Cautres and Mandran (2003)
down by age. Data for the 2008 and 2012 elections are similar: all show a positive cor-
relation between age, income and voting. And such relationships are not just observed
in the United States. Table 1.1 shows that voter turnout in France is also marked along
income groups, with wealthier segments of the population displaying greater rates of
electoral participation (Abrial, Cautres and Mandran, 2003).
1.2.3 Why Do People Vote?
How do we know that the direction of causation is from turnout to redistributive pol-
icy and not the other way around? That is to say, how do we know that more inequal-
ity and less redistributive policy themselves do not cause lower levels of turnout?
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Figure 1.3: Turnout by household income and age in the 2014 US presidential election
Source: US Census Bureau, Table 7 of the November 2014 Current Population Survey
Whilst there may be a possibility of reverse causation, such a hypothesis has received
little intellectual support. For one, all the theoretical implications of the median voter
theorem suggest that the direction of causation is from voters to government. For
another, the reasons why people vote are many but income distribution and taxation
policy do not appear to be among them. Instead, theoretical and empirical work tends
to point to such factors as the costs of registration (things like voter registration laws,
information acquisition and time); demographic factors (including education, income,
age, gender and race as discussed in the previous subsection); social and psychologi-
cal factors (the like of which include habit, marital status, civic duty and social image);
and the particular characteristics of a given election (tightness of the race) (Harder and
Krosnick 2008; Stefano DellaVigna 2017).
Elections Canada commissioned a survey following its 2 May 2011 General Elec-
tion in order to better understand the reasons why eligible voters did not cast their
ballots. As shown in Figure 1.4, inequality, taxation policy or government redistribu-
tion do not appear as reasons for abstaining. Whilst these figures cannot conclusively
rule out the possibility of reverse causality, the weight of evidence available seems to
support the hypothesis put forward in this chapter.
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Figure 1.4: Why voters did not vote in Canada’s 2011 General Election
Source: Labour Force Survey commissioned by Elections Canada, May 2011
1.3. Empirical Methodology
1.3.1 Data
The analysis is based on measures of voter turnout and top marginal tax rates in the 34
nations that comprise the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) for the period between 1974 and 2014. The OECD countries were chosen for
two reasons. First, by and large, the OECD Member States represent the advanced
democracies of the world where voting and elections take place most regularly and
it is the economic impact of voter turnout in such countries that we are interested to
study. Second, and relatedly, data are much more readily available for the variables
of interest within the universe of OECD nations. In this respect, a new dataset was
compiled from a number of sources described in this section.
Data for voter turnout comes from the International Institute for Democratic and
Electoral Assistance (IDEA). IDEA keeps two records for voter turnout: one, turnout,
that measures voter participation as a percentage of registered voters and a second,
VAP turnout, that measures voter participation as a fraction of the total voting age
population. The fact that VAP turnout captures turnout as a fraction of the voting age
population and not the eligible voting age population does raise some concerns as, for
example, expatriates and other non-citizens of voting age might be included in the
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population. However, because registering to vote is likely correlated with other deter-
minants of turnout, using turnout raises additional concerns related to endogeneity. In
addition, voter registration figures, according to IDEA, can be inaccurate or unavail-
able. These considerations lead me to choose VAP turnout as the key explanatory
variable in the study. In practice, however, the two measures are very similar and the
results of the study are robust to both.5 The IDEA database also includes a number
of other variables that I exploit as controls for the study in question. These include
whether the election was presidential or parliamentary,6 and Freedom House scores
that measure political and civil rights. Lastly, the database maintains a dummy vari-
able for whether a nation has compulsory voting laws, which I use as an instrument
in the last part of my analysis.
Information regarding the top marginal tax rates comes from the OECD, but are
compiled, for the years between 1974 to 2013, by the World Tax Database and The Tax
Policy Centre. Tax rates for 2014 are readily available from the website of the OECD.
I also obtain unemployment and population figures for each country in each year of
the sample from the OECD.
I used the World Bank Open Data to obtain data on GDP per capita as well
as annual growth in GDP. These are important control variables as they may have a
direct bearing both on voter turnout as well as on government tax policy decisions. In
addition, the World Bank data include figures for tertiary education enrolment rates
of each country for each year of the study. Including this variable allows me to control
for any education-related effects that may confound the analysis.
Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables in the data set while
Table A.2 in the Appendix describes the variables in more detail and provides their
sources.
1.3.2 Trends in Voter Turnout and the Top Marginal Tax Rate
Figure 1.5 shows a steady downward trend in both voter turnout and the top marginal
tax rates in 34 countries of the sample. Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows that similar
trends exist within each country. To get an initial understanding of the strength of
the relationship between the two variables, I plot, in Figure 1.6, the residuals from a
5Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows trends as well as differences between the two measures.
6Eleven countries in the sample have presidential and parliamentary elections in the same year. The
analysis is insensitive to whether I use only the presidential election data or only their parliamentary
election data. However, I choose, according to which election is more politically relevant, the most
sensible election for each country. The results are insensitive to such choices and I report which elections
from which country I use in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
CHAPTER 1. TURNING OUT FOR REDISTRIBUTION 13
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Entire Sample
Mean SD Min Max Observations
Turnout (%) 77.0 12.4 42 96 356
VAP Turnout (%) 73.5 12.5 35 95 357
Top Tax Rate (%) 49.1 14.1 12 91 1,159
GDP Per Capita (USD 1,000s) 20.9 18.3 .59 117 1,331
Annual GDP Growth Rate (%) 2.8 3.1 -15 13 1,268
Unemployment Rate (%) 7.0 4.1 .0068 27 1,210
Population (millions) 32.2 50.4 .22 319 1,383
Tertiary Education Enrollment Rate (%) 42.0 23.3 1.1 110 1,219
Freedom House - Political Rights 1.2 0.6 1 5 349
Freedom House - Civil Liberties 1.4 0.8 1 5 349
regression of top marginal tax rates on year dummies and country fixed effects against
the corresponding residuals of turnout. Plotting the residuals enables me to observe
variation in the two variables when all country and time heterogeneity have been
accounted for, thereby alleviating concerns of compositional effects that may arise in
a straightforward scatter plot. As shown, the relationship between the two variables
is positive.
1.3.3 OLS Estimates
To more formally assess the strength and direction of the relationship between voter
turnout and the top rate of marginal tax, I estimate the parameters of the following
specification:
TaxRateit = β0 + β1 ·VAPTurnoutit + Γ · Xit + uit (1.5)
Where TaxRateit is the top marginal tax rate in country i in year t and Xit is a
vector of country-specific controls as discussed in subsection 1.3.1. The idiosyncratic
disturbance term is expressed by uit and is clustered at the country level. The variable
of interest is β1, which can be interpreted as the effect, in terms of percentage points,
of a one percentage point increase in VAP turnout on top marginal tax rates across
the OECD. The results are shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.3 and indicate that,
accounting for a number of potentially confounding variables, β1 is significant and
positive, suggesting that a one percentage point increase in turnout is associated with
an approximate 0.5 percentage point increase in the top rate of marginal tax.
To investigate the relationship further, I include year dummies and country
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Figure 1.5: Top marginal tax rates and voter turnout in OECD Countries: 1974 to 2014
Figure 1.6: Scatter plot of tax rates and turnout in OECD countries
Note: This figure plots the residuals of a regression of top marginal tax rates on year and country fixed
effects against the residuals from a regression of voter turnout on year and country fixed effects. The
period of the sample is from 1974 to 2014.
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Table 1.3: OLS and Fixed Effects Regressions
Outcome: Top Marginal Tax Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VAP Turnout (%) 0.534∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗
(0.0852) (0.105) (0.104) (0.127)
Full Set of Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Observations 319 282 282 282
Number of Countries 34 34 34 34
Notes: The dependent variable is the top marginal tax rate in the 34
OECD countries. VAP Turnout is the percentage of the voting age popu-
lation that voted in a given election in a given year. Control variables in-
clude population, an indicator for whether the election was presidential
or parliamentary, GDP per capita, GDP growth rates, Freedom House
scores for political and civil rights, tertiary education enrolment rates
and the unemployment rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clus-
tered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
fixed effects to estimate the parameters of model 1.6. Year dummies, denoted by αt,
take into account any unobserved effects that are constant across countries but that
may fluctuate over time, such as busts and booms in the global economy. Country
fixed effects, indicated by δi, capture time-invariant, unobserved country heterogene-
ity and allow us to understand the within-country variation between the variables of
interest.
TaxRateit = δi + αt + β1 ·VAPTurnoutit + Γ · Xit + uit (1.6)
Results are shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.3 and are similar to the base-
line estimates. Column 3 shows the specification with year dummies whilst Column 4
shows the specification with both year dummies and country fixed effects. Column 4,
the preferred specification, shows that, while the coefficient of interest does decrease
from baseline OLS estimates, it remains positive, economically relevant and signifi-
cantly different to zero. This suggests that voter turnout has a significant impact on
top marginal tax rates even when unobserved time and country heterogeneity are ac-
counted for.
These results indicate that voter turnout in year t has a contemporaneous effect
on top marginal tax rates. Is this plausible? That is to say, if we believe the relationship
is causal, do (or better yet, can) governments react that quickly to voter preferences?
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Table 1.4: Fixed Effects Regressions with Time Leads
Top Marginal Tax Rates in Year...
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t+1 t+2 t+3 Election Cycle Avg.
VAP Turnout (%) 0.214∗ 0.138 0.191∗∗ 0.219∗∗
(0.114) (0.0904) (0.0871) (0.106)
Full Set of Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 281 274 270 289
Number of Countries 34 34 34 34
Notes: The dependent variable is the top marginal tax rate in the 34 OECD coun-
tries with different time leads in Columns 1 to 3 and over the election cycle in Col-
umn 4. VAP Turnout is the percentage of the voting age population that voted in
a given election in a given year. Control variables include population, an indicator
for whether the election was presidential or parliamentary, GDP per capita, GDP
growth rates, Freedom House scores for political and civil rights, tertiary education
enrolment rates and the unemployment rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
To increase confidence in the reliability of the estimates thus far obtained, I regress top
marginal tax rates in years t + 1, t + 2 and t + 3 on turnout. I also regress the average
value of the top marginal tax rate over the entire election cycle for each election in each
country on turnout.7 Results are shown in Table 1.4 which shows that the relationship
remains significant at conventional levels and of similar magnitude to the baseline
estimates.
To further increase confidence that the relationship observed is not spurious, I
carry out a placebo test by regressing tax rates in years t− 1, t− 2 and t− 3 on turnout
in year t. The idea is that voter turnout provides a mandate for the tax policies of the
incoming government; accordingly, we cannot expect elections in period t to have an
effect on government policies that precede it, that is to say, in period t − n. Results
are shown in Table 1.5 and show that, as expected, turnout has little to no explanatory
power over tax rates in the years prior to an election. The coefficients are much smaller
and, with the exception of Column 2, are not significantly different than zero.
7The total number of elections and the average length of the electoral cycle in each OECD country for
the period of the sample are shown in Figures A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix.
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Table 1.5: Fixed Effects Regressions with Time Lags
Top Marginal Tax Rates in Year...
(1) (2) (3)
t–1 t–2 t–3
VAP Turnout (%) 0.0323 0.158∗ 0.0895
(0.115) (0.0896) (0.0944)
Full Set of Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 273 268 267
Number of Countries 34 34 34
Notes: The dependent variable is the top marginal tax rate in the
34 OECD countries with different time lags. VAP Turnout is the
percentage of the voting age population that voted in a given elec-
tion in a given year. Control variables include population, an in-
dicator for whether the election was presidential or parliamen-
tary, GDP per capita, GDP growth rates, Freedom House scores
for political and civil rights, tertiary education enrolment rates
and the unemployment rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1.3.4 Instrumental Variables
Thus far, the analysis has shown a statistically significant relationship between voter
participation and the top marginal tax rate. Naturally, the correlation uncovered does
not necessarily imply that the relationship is causal. Nonetheless, the correlation is ro-
bust to a range of controls related to the social, economic and political characteristics
of the countries in the sample as well as to unobserved time and country heterogene-
ity. Results also hold when tax rates at various points in the future are regressed on
turnout in time period t, suggesting that turnout is a factor in the redistributive policy
of incoming governments. Still, one may be concerned about the existence of variables
that are both correlated with turnout and determinants of tax rates, variables which
would ultimately confound the analysis.
In this section, I undertake an instrumental variables strategy in an effort to
further test the robustness and causal validity of the results. Specifically, I use an
indicator variable for whether or not a country has compulsory voting laws as an
instrument for voter turnout. In doing so, I follow Hoffman, Leon and Lombardi
(2017) who use compulsory voting as an instrument to study the impact of turnout
on social spending in Austria. The intuition is that compulsory voting laws have
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no effect on tax rates except through voter turnout. The instrument is valid to the
extent that it is (a) relevant to turnout and (b) orthogonal to the disturbance term
of equation 1.5. Between 1974 and 2014, 10 of the OECD countries had, or continue
to have, compulsory voting laws. Table A.3 in the Appendix illustrates the various
experiences of the OECD countries with compulsory voting laws and makes clear
that such laws do not change frequently.
The coefficient of the first stage (not reported) is positive and statistically signif-
icant at the 1 percent level. This result consistent with other studies that document the
effect of compulsory voting on turnout (Hoffman, Leon and Lombardi, 2017; Quinte-
lier, Hooghe and Marien, 2011). However, despite the precision of the first stage, the
first-stage F-statistic, reported in the penultimate row of Table 1.6, is less than 10, indi-
cating a weak instrument. The 2SLS results are also estimated imprecisely, as shown
in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.6. Therefore, this evidence should be taken as simply
as suggestive. Nonetheless, it is encouraging that the 2SLS estimates are comparable,
terms of magnitude and sign, to those of earlier specifications. The reader will also
notice that I use only the tax rates averaged over the electoral cycle as the dependent
variable. Using other outcome variables (i.e. tax rates in years t or t+ n) yields similar
results to what is reported; I use the average outcome variable because it provides an
indication of the effect of turnout over the entire electoral cycle.
A limitation of instrumental variable approaches is that the results rely, in part,
on the exclusion restriction of the instrument which cannot be tested. In this partic-
ular context, the exclusion restriction implies that compulsory voting laws affect top
marginal tax rates only through voter turnout. Although this claim cannot be empir-
ically verified, I undertake a simple check to increase confidence that the exclusion
restriction is satisfied. I run a reduced form regression on a sub-sample of the data,
restricted to non-election years. The intuition is simple: if compulsory voting laws
only exert influence on tax rates through voter turnout, then we expect to see no rela-
tionship between compulsory voting laws and tax rates in years for which there is no
voting (i.e. non-election years). Column 3 of Table 1.6 shows the results and we see
that, as expected, the coefficient on compulsory voting is not significantly different to
zero.
A better understanding of the nature of compulsory voting laws can also pro-
vide evidence in support of the claim that the instrument satisfies the exclusion re-
striction. In this respect, two ideas stand out. First, although compulsory voting laws
are enacted and repealed within some countries, such changes do not occur often. For
instance, just four of the countries in the sample (Turkey, Italy, Chile and three states in
Austria) changed their compulsory voting laws in the period between 1974 and 2014
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Table 1.6: Instrumental Variables Regression
Outcome: Top Marginal Tax Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Top Tax Rate Election Cycle Average Top Tax Rate
VAP Turnout (%) 0.385 0.267
(0.647) (0.510)
Compulsory Voting -1.393
(3.313)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
Observations 265 271 744
First Stage F–Statistic 7.22 7.28 —
Number of Countries 34 34 34
Notes: The dependent variable is the top marginal tax rate in the 34 OECD countries. VAP
Turnout is the percentage of the voting age population that voted in a given election in
a given year instrumented by an indicator for whether a given country has compulsory
voting laws. Control variables include population, an indicator for whether the election
was presidential or parliamentary, GDP per capita, GDP growth rates, Freedom House
scores for political and civil rights, tertiary education enrolment rates and the unemploy-
ment rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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(Turkey enacted the law in 1983 while the other three repealed it at various times in
the past 25 years).8 Thus, the low rate at which such laws are altered within countries
makes it difficult to understand how such laws could have a direct impact on tax rates
which have changed so much over the 40 years of the sample.
A second point to bear in mind is why such laws were introduced in the first
place. The precise reasons vary but in nearly all the cases of the OECD, the laws
were introduced to accompany such changes to the political system as the expansion
of suffrage or protection to civil rights. A research report prepared by the Electoral
Commission of the United Kingdom (Younger, 2006), for example, makes clear that
compulsory voting is introduced in various countries mainly to address low rates of
turnout (Australia), to restore a sense of civic duty (Italy), or to accompany universal
enfranchisement (Belgium). Compulsory voting laws, therefore, are not introduced—
at least not explicitly—to serve economic purposes. Instead, they have been intro-
duced to accompany other changes to the political system and as such, they seem to
have little direct bearing on redistributive policy of the past or present. To the extent,
therefore, that the exclusion restriction holds true, the overall sign and magnitude
of the instrumental variables estimation confirm the analysis of this study that voter
turnout does indeed have an impact on top marginal tax rates.
1.4. Discussion
Across a number of specifications, the results derived in this chapter suggest that a
one percentage point increase in voter turnout leads to an increase in the top marginal
tax rate in the order of 0.25 percentage points. In this section, I explore how large this
effect is by carrying out some tax rate accounting. I also discuss the strengths and
limitations of the paper and point out areas for future research.
If the correlations uncovered are indeed causal, then the 12 percentage point
decrease in VAP turnout in the OECD countries between the late 1970s and early 2010s
is associated with a 3 percentage point decrease in top marginal tax rates. Given that
the average tax rate across the OECD has dropped by 23 percentage points, from 65
percent to 42 percent over the same time period, the fall in voter turnout explains
some 13 percent of the fall in tax rates. Conversely, let us imagine a hypothetical
situation in which voter turnout increased by 12 percentage points from the 1974–
1975 average. This would imply participation of 90 percent of the total voting age
population. A 12 percentage point increase in turnout would lead to a 3 percentage
point increase in the top marginal tax rate to 69.6 percent. Interestingly, this number
8This presents certain challenges with regard to the precision of the 2SLS estimates and I will have
more to say about this in the discussion.
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resembles tax rate figures of several advanced industrial nations in the not-so-distant
past. Germany, for example, experienced top marginal tax rates as high as 75 percent
in the early 1950s and a 90 percent rate in the late 1940s (Alvaredo et al., 2013). The
United Kingdom set top income tax rates as high as 98 percent in the 1950s, 1960s and
1970s while the United States levied a 91 percent tax on top incomes in the 1950s and
1960s and then relaxed the rate to 70 percent or more throughout the 1970s (Alvaredo
et al., 2013; Piketty, 2015). A tax rate of some 70 percent on top incomes is also in line
with estimates carried out by Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva (2014) who argue that if
bargaining effects are moderately large, tax rates of 80 percent and higher may, in fact,
be “consistent with a sensibly specified optimal tax model”. Of course, the purpose
of this section is not to argue a certain tax rate or even to suggest that the super-
rich ought to pay more to the public purse. Instead, it is intended to illustrate the
degree to which ordinary citizens could exert influence on public policy were they to
be mobilised in greater numbers on election day.
Are the results derived in this chapter causal? It is difficult to say. On the one
hand, a limitation of large, cross-sectional studies like this one is that sharp identifi-
cation, from which causal inference can be made with greater confidence, is hard to
come by. As mentioned in the subsection on instrumental variables, only four coun-
tries in my sample experience variation in the variable that serves as the instrument.
This means that I rely on the variation of the instrument in four countries to predict
the exogenous variation of turnout in a sample of 34 nations which may be one of
the reasons why 2SLS results are estimated imprecisely. On the other hand, the re-
sults of the paper seem to suggest more than just a spurious correlation: estimates
derived using OLS, panel methods and instrumental variables all point in the same
direction: greater turnout has a positive effect on government redistributive policy.
Given that this is, to my knowledge, the first study that investigates the relationship
between turnout and tax rates, the results of this study, far from casting doubt on the
nature of the relationship, call out for further research, perhaps using micro-level or
sub-national data in order to benefit from sharper identification strategies.
1.5. Conclusion
This chapter adds to the literature that aims at better understanding the economic
consequences of voter turnout. For the most part, this literature has focused on the
relationship between voter turnout and government redistribution, as measured by
how much governments allocate to spending on social ends such as health, education
and pensions. These empirical studies confirm the results of the median voter theorem
which asserts that, as voting approaches universal levels, governments tend more
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towards redistributive policies.
In this chapter, I have built on these studies by exploring the relationship be-
tween voter turnout and a more direct measure of redistribution, namely, the top
marginal tax rate. The theory motivating this study is similar to those of previous
ones: if governments are intended to respond to the preferences of the median voter,
a question arises as to what the economic consequences are when voter turnout de-
clines and when that decline is marked along class lines. I have shown that increased
participation in elections is associated with a positive and statistically significant im-
pact on top marginal tax rates.
To assess the strength and direction of the relationship between the two, I under-
took a number of empirical strategies. First, I included a range of social and economic
characteristics that may confound the analysis. I then exploited the panel nature of my
dataset to account for any unobserved country or time heterogeneity. As a final step, I
employed an instrumental variables strategy in an effort to isolate only the exogenous
variation voter turnout. I also take into account that governments may take time to
respond to the mandate given to them by voters. As such, I modified my baseline
specification in order to estimate the impact of turnout on tax rates in periods t + n
as well as over the entire electoral cycle. Across all specifications, results confirm my
hypothesis that more turnout demands more redistribution.
Taken together, the results of this chapter underscore what may seem to be a
self-evident truth: voting matters. Yet, in spite of the veracity of such a seemingly
simple claim, fewer and fewer people are turning out to vote. This study shows that
doing so is not without consequences.
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Appendix A
A.1 Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Turnout and VAPTurnout in OECD countries: 1974 to 2014
Figure A.2: Trends in Top Marginal Tax Rates and Voter Turnout in each OECD Coun-
try
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Figure A.3: Total number of elections over the period of the sample in each country
Figure A.4: Average number of years per election cycle in each OECD country
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A.2 Additional Tables
Table A.1: Summary Statistics for the First and Last 5 Years of the Sample
Mean SD Min Max Observations
Panel A: 1974 to 1979
Turnout (%) 82.0 11.3 48 95 47
VAP Turnout (%) 78.5 11.7 41 95 47
Top Tax Rate (%) 65.8 11.0 40 91 136
GDP Per Capita (USD 1,000s) 6.1 3.5 .59 16 168
Annual GDP Growth Rate (%) 3.5 3.3 -11 13 158
Unemployment Rate (%) 4.3 2.7 .0068 9.9 140
Population (millions) 27.5 41.8 .22 225 204
Tertiary Education Enrollment Rate (%) 19.7 10.0 1.1 55 169
Freedom House - Political Rights 1.4 0.6 1 4 46
Freedom House - Civil Liberties 1.4 0.7 1 4 46
Panel B: 2010 to 2014
Turnout (%) 70.1 13.0 42 93 49
VAP Turnout (%) 66.6 11.3 40 87 49
Top Tax Rate (%) 42.5 10.9 15 60 136
GDP Per Capita (USD 1,000s) 40.9 23.6 8.9 117 170
Annual GDP Growth Rate (%) 1.7 2.5 -9.1 9.2 170
Unemployment Rate (%) 8.6 4.7 3.1 27 166
Population (millions) 37.9 59.7 .32 319 159
Tertiary Education Enrollment Rate (%) 71.3 16.7 18 110 126
Freedom House - Political Rights 1.1 0.5 1 3 48
Freedom House - Civil Liberties 1.2 0.6 1 4 48
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Table A.2: Description of Variables Used in the Dataset
Variable Description Source
Turnout Calculated by dividing the number of
people who voted by the total number
of people who were registered for elec-
tions.
IDEA
VAP Turnout Calculated by dividing the number of
people who voted by the total voting
age population.
IDEA
Tax Rate Top marginal tax rate, expressed as a
percentage.
OECD, World Tax Databse, Tax
Policy Centre
GDP Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP
at market prices based on constant lo-
cal currency. Aggregates are based on
constant 2005 U.S. dollars.
World Bank OpenData
GDPPC GDP per capita: gross domestic prod-
uct divided by midyear population.
Data in current USD.
World Bank OpenData
Population Total population in a country. OECD
Unemployment Total number of unemployed people
aged 15 and over
OECD
Tertiary Education
Enrolment
Total enrolment in tertiary education,
regardless of age, expressed as a per-
centage of the total population of the
five-year age group following on from
secondary school leaving.
World Bank OpenData
Freedom House -
Political and Civil
Rights
Freedom House index of political and
civil rights: index ranges from 1 (free)
to 7 (not free).
IDEA (taken from Free-
dom House)
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Table A.3: OECD Countries and Compulsory Voting
OECD Countries with Compulsory Voting Laws
Country Year Introduced Enforced?
Australia 1924 Yes. Non-voter faces a fine.
Austria 1929 to 1982 (all states) Yes. Non-voters faced a fine.
Austria (Tyrol) 1929 to 2002 Yes. Non-voter faced a fine.
Austria (Vorarlberg) 1929 to 2004 Yes. Non-voter faced a fine.
Austria (Styria) 1929 to 1993 Yes
Austria (Carinthia) 1986 to 1993 Yes
Belgium 1893 (men) 1949 (women) Yes. Possible imprisonment.
Non-participation in 4 or more
elections over 15 years leads to
disenfranchisement.
Chile 1925 to 2012 Yes. Non-voter faced a fine and
possible imprisonment.
France (Senate) 1950s or 60s No
Greece 1926 No
Italy 1946 to 1993 No
Luxembourg 1919 Yes. Non-voter faces a fine but
voting is compulsory only for
those who are registered to vote
and registering is not manda-
tory. Voting is voluntary for citi-
zens over 70.
Mexico Prior to 1946 No
The Netherlands 1917 to 1967 No
Spain 1907 to 1923 No
Switzerland
(Schaffhausen)
1904 Yes. Non-voter faces a fine.
Turkey 1982 Yes. Non-voter faces a fine.
United States (Georgia) 1777 No
OECD Countries without Compulsory Voting Laws
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ice-
land, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom
Source: International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Taken from its
Compulsory Voting web page.
Table A.4: Elections chosen for countries with Presidential and Parliamentary Elec-
tions in the same year
Presidential Elections Parliamentary Elections
United States Republic of Ireland
France Austria
Chile Czech Republic
Mexico Slovenia
South Korea
Portugal
Poland

Chapter 2
The Political Economy of Immigrant Legalisation:
Evidence from the 1986 IRCA∗
2.1. Introduction
Undocumented migration has today become a hotly contested issue. This contest is,
perhaps, fiercer nowhere than in the United States where, as of 2016, an estimated 11.3
million migrants reside in the country illegally, up from 5.8 million in 1996.1 Given
the polarised nature of the issue, we ask in this chapter what happens to the distribu-
tion of state and local finances when undocumented migrants are offered legal status
through a nation-wide amnesty. We answer the question by focussing on the actions
of incumbent state governors: how do they respond, in terms of public resource allo-
cation, to the incentives created by documenting undocumented migrants? Do they
allocate more public resources to the areas affected by amnesty and to what extent is
such allocation intended to capture the votes of the newly documented migrants as
opposed to other, perhaps competing, constituents?
The history of the United States offers a unique opportunity to study these is-
sues. In 1986, the Reagan Administration passed into law the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) which legalised nearly 3 million undocumented migrants in
the span of some three years and offered them a path to citizenship five years af-
∗This chapter is joint work with Christoph Winter. We owe a debt of gratitude to Davide Cantoni
for his support and advice throughout the project. In addition, we thank Nava Ashraf, Tim Besley,
Marvin Deversi, Jeremiah Dittmar, Florian Englmaier, Francesco Fasani, Greg Fischer, Joshua Gottlieb,
Yosh Halberstam, Benjamin Häusinger, Mitch Hoffman, Ethan Ilzetzki, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Andreas
Peichl, Yona Rubinstein, Thomas Sampson, Andreas Steinmayr, Till Stowasser, Daniel Sturm, Munir
Squires, Uwe Sunde, Ebonya Washington, Daniel Wissmann, Stephane Wolton, Noam Yuchtman as well
as seminar participants at the University of Munich, SWEAT at the University of Toronto, the University
of Guelph, the EBE Summer Meeting, CEMIR Junior Economist Workshop on Migration Research at the
ifo Institute, the 2018 Congress of the Verein für Socialpolitik, the 20th annual INFER conference, and
the 2018 Econometric Society Winter Meeting for constructive comments and criticisms. All remaining
errors are our own.
1Pew Research Centre, taken from http://pewrsr.ch/2oWlM93 Accessed 9 February 2018.
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ter legalisation. In this study, we combine variation in legal status from the IRCA
with administrative data from the Census of Governments in order to throw light on
the ways in which documenting undocumented migrants affects the distribution of
state and local finances. Our analysis is motivated by a model of distributive politics
in which incumbent politicians react to changes in the electorate by adjusting their
budget allocations to target the preferences of the newly enfranchised group so as to
optimise (a) the welfare of the population and (b) their own re-election chances. Ac-
cordingly, we posit that governors, who play an important role in formulating the
state budget, will allocate resources strategically to those counties most affected by
the IRCA in an effort to win the political support of the newly documented migrants
who were eligible to vote five years after legalisation.
Using a difference-in-differences regression framework, we compare the distri-
bution of public finances—specifically, per capita inter-governmental transfers from
state to local governments—in counties that experienced more per capita legalisations
with those that received less both before and after 1986. Our baseline estimate sug-
gests that counties with a greater share of IRCA-documented migrants received more
per capita transfers from their state governments than those with a fewer share of
such migrants. The result is not driven by differences in county social, economic or
demographic characteristics and is robust to alternative specifications and samples.
To overcome potential geographical endogeneity associated with where undoc-
umented migrants settle, we follow two approaches: first, we employ propensity
score matching to identify a more comparable control group and second, we use the
share of a county’s 1960 population that is foreign-born as an instrument for the num-
ber of documented migrants per county post-1986. These tests confirm that the base-
line result is not confounded by geographical factors.
Arguably, our result may be driven by mechanical or bureaucratic forces that
oblige the state governor to better service the areas where the newly documented
migrants reside rather than, as we posit, discretionary forces borne out of political
calculation. To refute this competing explanation we analyse, in the second part, the
sensitivity of inter-governmental transfers to political constraints. The rationale is
straightforward. If the transfers of the state government are reflective of forces out-
side the control of the governor, then the result ought to be insensitive to political
constraints faced by the governor. If, on the other hand, the transfers are politically
motivated, the result ought to exhibit heterogeneity with respect to the various polit-
ical constraints facing the incumbent. Consistent with this line of thinking, we find
that counties affected by the IRCA receive more resources from the state when their
governor is eligible for re-election, faces political competition, enjoys line-item veto
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power over the budget or is politically aligned with the state legislature. We also
uncover heterogeneity along party lines: although both Republican and Democratic
governors allocate significantly more resources to IRCA-affected counties, the effect
increases by about half when the governor is a Democrat. It is, perhaps, unsurprising,
therefore, that we also find that a governor’s likelihood for re-election increases in the
share of newly documented migrants in a state.
Finally, the IRCA provided a path to citizenship five years after legalisation.
How plausible is it, then, that governors target their transfers to actually meet the
needs, and win over the future political support, of the newly legalised as opposed
to other, perhaps competing, constituents in a county? To address this issue, we first
undertake a number of empirical checks to alleviate concerns that anti-migrant sen-
timent may drive our results. In this respect, we exploit data on a prominent anti-
migrant ballot measure in California and find no relationship between state transfers
and the interaction between a county’s share of legalised migrants and its support
for the ballot measure. More generally, we utilise survey data from the entire United
States and find that, if anything, areas more affected by the IRCA actually experience
improvements in attitudes towards both documented and undocumented migrants,
further suggesting that anti-migrant sentiment is not confounding our results. Next,
we turn our attention to local expenditure and find that expenditure in education
increases in the share of newly documented migrants in a county. Hispanic individ-
uals, as opposed to Caucasian ones, residing in these counties and who entered mid-
dle school after 1986 experience improvements in the likelihood of completing high
school, suggesting that the additional resources a county receives on account of the
IRCA were in fact targeted to the newly legalised as opposed to other voting blocs.
Together, these results point to a strong, nuanced political economy facet of im-
migrant legalisation. Although models of distributive politics generally predict that
the expansion of franchise leads to greater resources being allocated to those who have
a new-found political voice, it is more of an open question to what extent politicians
allocate resources to capture this new “swing” vote as opposed to further solidify a
core constituency. Our results indicate that, at least in the context of undocumented
migration, politicians allocate resources primarily in an effort to capture the political
support of the new swing vote rather than that of other groups.
In this chapter, we offer two contributions. First, we contribute to the literature
that sheds light on the distributional effects of the expansion of voter franchise. Cas-
cio and Washington (2014), for example, study enfranchisement of African Americans
in the United States through the Voting Rights Act of 1965. They find that counties
that removed literacy tests at voter registration in response to the law experienced
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greater voter turnout among black voters which, in turn, increased the share of public
spending directed towards them. In a similar vein, Miller (2008) shows that the en-
franchisement of women in the United States was followed by immediate changes in
legislative behaviour and substantial increases in public health spending at the local
level. Examining the impact of electronic voting technology in Brasil, Fujiwara (2015)
finds that the enfranchisement of lesser educated citizens affected government spend-
ing and increased health care spending, both of which are particularly beneficial for
lower-income people. Naidu (2012), looking at a case of disenfranchisement, analy-
ses the effects of the introduction of poll taxes and literacy tests in the 19th century
United States and finds that such measures lowered overall voter turnout with the
subsequent effect of worse educational outcomes for black pupils and losses in an-
nual income in the order of 15 percent for black labourers. We extend this literature
to consider the case of undocumented Hispanic migrants in the United States, one of
the largest disenfranchised groups in the country. Moreover, because of our rich data
on state governors, we are able to examine some of the political mechanisms that lead
governors to allocate resources in light of a sudden shock to the electorate.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the economics of legal status. In this
respect, the IRCA has been used as a credible policy shock to identify the impact of
legal status on various social and economic outcomes at the level of the individual
migrant.2 For example, Cortes (2013) shows that legal status helps migrants to ob-
tain better educational outcomes whilst Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) and Pan
(2012) use the IRCA to show that documenting undocumented migrants leads to an
improvement in their wages, employment prospects and ability to speak English. We
contribute to this literature by examining the influence of legal status directly on the
distribution of public resources at the state and local level, bringing to light a dimen-
sion of undocumented migration that is highly debated yet relatively understudied.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 contextualises the study
by discussing the historical background of the IRCA as well as the demographic char-
acteristics of its applicants. In Section 2.3 we present a simple framework that guides
our empirical analysis and the interpretation of our findings. Section 2.4 describes our
data and explains institutional features associated with the budget-making process at
the state level. Section 2.5 outlines our econometric methodology and, along with
sections 2.6 and 2.7, presents our results. Section 2.8 concludes.
2Although some studies consider the impact of legal status on more aggregate outcomes. Baker
(2015), for example, finds that counties with greater shares of IRCA applicants experienced a decline
in crime rates.
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2.2. Background
2.2.1 The Immigration Reform and Control Act
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 was, to date, the most exten-
sive piece of legislation put forward by the United States government to address the
question of undocumented immigration. The passage of the IRCA was by no means
straightforward. It began in the 1970s when the legislative and executive branches
of government considered various elements of comprehensive immigration reform.
These efforts gained momentum when, in 1977, Congress appointed the Select Com-
mission on Immigration and Refugee Policy which presented, in 1981, a proposal for
immigration reform which was ultimately rejected. In the years that followed, sev-
eral other proposals were put forward and variants of the IRCA were passed through
either the Senate or the House but none was able to win complete approval until the
99th Congress settled on and approved the IRCA on 17 October 1986 and which was
signed into law on 6 November 1986.3
The purpose of the IRCA was to restrict the flow of undocumented migrants
into the United States. It rested on three main pillars: an employer sanctions provision
that made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers; increased
funding for border security to discourage new people from migrating illegally; and
an amnesty programme intended to legalise various unauthorized workers (Chishti
and Kamasaki, 2014).
While each of the components of the law was not without problems (in par-
ticular the employer sanction scheme which led to a great amount of fraud as well
as workplace discrimination), the legalisation programme is generally regarded as
the law’s most successful provision. It provided two programmes for two distinct
groups of unauthorized workers. First, the Legally Authorized Workers (LAWs, also
knows as “pre-82s”) under section 245A of the law enabled undocumented immi-
grants who resided in the country for an uninterrupted period from before 1 January
1982 to legalise (DHHS (December 1991), Cascio and Lewis (2018)). Second, the Spe-
cial Agricultural Workers (SAW) under Section 210 of the law allowed applications
from unauthorized migrants who could show that they carried out 90 days of work
on select USDA defined seasonal crops in the year leading to 1 May 1986 (DHHS
(December 1991); Cascio and Lewis (2018)). LAW applicants were eligible to apply
3The timing of the IRCA’s passage in 1986 was indeed sudden and unexpected. Just days before its
passage in Congress, “congressional leaders pronounced it dead, this time after more than fifteen months
of hearings, legislative negotiations and debate” (Fuchs, 1990). Speaking to this idea, Representative
Daniel E. Lungren (R-California) remarked on the day of the bill’s passage that the IRCA was “a corpse
going to the morgue, and on the way to the morgue a toe began to twitch and we started CPR again”
(Fuchs, 1990). See Table B.1 for details on how Congress voted to pass the bill.
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within a 12-month time frame extending from May 1987 to May 1988 whereas SAW
applicants had an 18-month application period from 1 June 1987 to 30 November 1988
(DHHS, December 1991). On acceptance of their application, applicants were given
temporary legal status under the title of Temporary Resident Aliens which could last for
as long as 18 months. After this period, and upon successful completion of an English
test and a civics test, applicants were given permanent resident status.
At the time of the Act, there were some 3 million undocumented immigrants
residing in the United States, corresponding to nearly 1 percent of the population
(Wasem, 2012). The law stipulated that both application periods (the 12 months for
the LAW programme and 18 months for the SAW programme) were strictly enforced,
which from an econometric point of view implies a relatively clean identification pe-
riod. Indeed, by the end of the application period, roughly 3 million people applied
for temporary resident status, of which 1.7 million comprised LAWs and 1.3 million
comprised SAWs (DHHS, December 1991). By 1990, 94.6 percent and 58.7 percent,
respectively, of LAW and SAW applications had received approval and for all intents
and purposes, the legalisation programme of the IRCA ceased to generate newly le-
galised citizens after 1990 (DHHS, December 1991). Figure 2.1 shows the time trend
of the stock of IRCA legalised migrants while Figure 2.2 shows the geographic dis-
tribution of IRCA applicants at the county level in 1992 for those counties for which
data is available.4 As shown, the majority of legalisations took place between 1986
and 1990 and in the states of California (970,895), Texas (351,646), Illinois (125,399),
Arizona (70,488) and New Jersey (29,012). As shown in Figure 2.3, undocumented mi-
grants applied for legal status in approximately 330 counties whereas the remaining
counties received no such applications.
2.2.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Legalised
Figure 2.4 presents data from the December 1991 report to Congress from the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services which documented the characteristics of the le-
galised population. These data indicate that the newly legalised are predominantly of
working age, healthy and with relatively few children. More than half and two-thirds,
respectively, are single and male and the vast majority of applicants were engaged in
full-time work. Fully 22 percent of all applicants reported a household income of over
4Of the 3,142 counties in the United States, our dataset includes IRCA information on 2,760 of them
(and from all states except Alaska and Delaware). However, we do not observe every county in every
year because some of the counties drop out in the later stages of the sample. As such, the actual number
of treated counties varies slightly in the sample from 276 counties in 1999 to 332 in 1991/92. Restricting
the analysis to only those counties that we observe throughout the entirety of the sample makes no
difference to the results.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of legalised migrants
Note: This graph plots the distribution of the legalised migrants in 1992. The left panel indicates the
number of treated (332) and control (2,047) counties whereas the panel on the right plots the distribution
of treatment within treated counties. On a linear scale, the average treated county experienced 4.4 appli-
cations per 1,000 county inhabitants. The average population size of treated counties is just over 409,490,
implying that on average 1,800 migrants received legal status in treated counties.
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$600 per week; well over the poverty line, which, in 1989 stood at $6,311 for a single
person ($121 per week) and $12,675 for a family of four ($244 per week) (Mosbacher
and Bryant, 1991).5 In fact, median take-home pay for IRCA applicants stood at $400
per week. Median household income in the population in 1989 stood at $23,745, or
$456 per week. The report also makes clear that no more than 5 percent of the mi-
grants reported not being able to work in the month prior to the survey. As such,
IRCA applicants were, by and large, an economically active and self-reliant group
earning somewhere between the poverty threshold and median income.
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Figure 2.4: Socio-economic characteristics of the IRCA applicants
Notes: These are the characteristics of the IRCA migrants as reported by Congress in 1991.
Source: DHHS (December 1991)
2.3. Incumbent Politicians: A Framework
In this section, we present a simple framework to guide our empirical analysis. In
this framework, an incumbent politician controls the distribution of transfers flowing
5The National Longitudinal Survey of the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics suggests the poverty
thresholds in 1989 were even lower: $5,980 for a single person and $12,100 for a family of four. Taken
from http://bit.ly/2tGnz8V, accessed in August 2017.
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from the state budget to the various counties in the state. The politician is concerned
both with the welfare of the population and her own re-election. A sudden change
of legal status in a large and homogeneous group of residents in a county will thus
change the politician’s decision on how to distribute state resources so as to optimize
her re-election chances and the welfare of the population. In our setting, therefore,
we expect that the legalisation of a large group of mostly Hispanic people of lower
socio-economic status will prompt politicians to offer policy over public resources so
as to target the preferred outcome of the newly legalised group in the hope of winning
their future political support.6
2.3.1 Politician Pay-off
We begin by modelling the objective function of an incumbent politician, P. In doing
so, we adapt a model presented by Englmaier and Stowasser (2017) to consider a case
of a state governor. For every county in the state, P transfers an amount of government
assistance, g > 0, to the population at cost C(g). As mentioned above, P is concerned
with the utility of the residents, U, in every county as well as the utility derived from
her expected vote share in elections, Ω.
Each county is composed of two types of inhabitants: already legal citizens, C,
and newly legalised migrants, L. The population in each county is normalised to one
such that the share of the population that is newly legalised is α and the share of al-
ready legal citizens is 1− α. Only citizens can vote and voting decisions are based
on local economic conditions, such as government expenditure on various public ser-
vices. Voters base their voting decisions not just on local conditions immediately prior
to the election but throughout P’s term.
For every county in the state, P has a pay-off, Π, that is composed of three parts,
shown in equation (2.1):
6In theory, there are two channels through which a policy shock such as the IRCA can affect the distri-
bution of public resources (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). On the one hand, it might prompt a distribution
of resources that is broad and general, for example, social benefits to all the members of some broadly
defined group, such as the unemployed or the elderly. On the other, such programmes may be targeted
and specific, aiming to benefit a more narrowly defined subgroup of the population. Broad redistributive
programmes are those that appeal to the majority of the electorate and reflect their policy preferences.
More targeted programmes, by contrast, impose little cost on the majority of the electorate but offer great
incentives for its beneficiaries. Although state tax revenue does increase with the share of documented
migrants in a state, the tax rate does not increase as a function of IRCA applicants and we show results
later in the paper that suggest the transfers IRCA-affected counties receive from the state are, in fact,
used for targeted local expenditures.
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Π = (1− α)UC(g) + αUL(g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+ E ·Ω[φ((1− α)UC(g) + αUL(g))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
−C(g)︸︷︷︸
3
(2.1)
The politician is concerned with the well being of the population in each county.
This is reflected in the first term of P’s pay-off, (1− α)UC(g) + αUL(g). We assume
utility functions are concave such that U′i (g) > 0 and U
′′
i (g) < 0 ∀ i ∈ {C, L}. The
only way in which P can improve the utility of the population is through her allocation
of g. Because the characteristics of the documented migrants presented earlier, we
take it as given that U′L(g) > U
′
C(g) ∀ g.
We assume there are gains to staying in office. Accordingly, the second term,
E ·Ω[φ((1− α)UC(g) + αUL(g))], captures the pay-off P obtains from re-election. E
is a binary variable that is one when P is eligible for re-election and zero when P is
a lame duck. In every election for which P is eligible to run, φ captures her expected
vote share in that election which is a function of the well being of the population.
We assume that φ is a linear function bounded between zero and one. The utility P
derives from this expected vote share is captured by Ω. It is assumed that Ω(φ), a
strictly increasing, non-linear function with a negative third order derivative. Figure
B.1 provides an illustration of what such a function might look like. As shown, the
marginal utility derived from the expected vote share is the greatest at the inflection
point of Ω(φ = φT) which represents the winning threshold.
Finally, the last term of equation 2.1 indicates the costs, C(g), to the incumbent
associated with allocating g to a given county. These capture the opportunity costs
associated with distributing g among the different counties in a given state so as to
remain within the budget constraint. Costs are sufficiently convex such that ∂
2ΠP
∂g2 < 0.
A rational incumbent politician thus maximises her expected pay-off over the
allocation of state grants. That allocation is strongly affected by the share of newly
legalised migrants, α, in a county. From this follows Predictions 1 to 3 which help
guide our empirical analysis.
Prediction 1: The optimal allocation of state aid increases in the share of newly
documented migrants in a county.
Prediction 2: The optimal allocation of state aid is larger when P is eligible for
re-election and less when (s)he is a lame duck.
Prediction 3: The optimal allocation of state aid becomes larger the closer the
P’s expected vote share is to the winning threshold.
Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
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2.4. Data and Institutional Context
2.4.1 Data
The key explanatory variable in our study is a measure of the number of IRCA ap-
plicants per 1,000 county inhabitants in the United States for the period between 1980
and 2000. In the treated counties (i.e. those counties that received at least 1 application
for legal status), this value ranged from as little as .04 to as many as 50 applications
per 1,000 county inhabitants.7 To carry out our analysis, we compiled a new dataset
from a number of different administrative sources. Table 2.1 shows summary statis-
tics of the main variables in our study according to whether they are in treated or
non-treated counties.
7By 1992, treated counties received, on average, eight applications per 1,000 county inhabitants which
translates into some 2,800 applications for legal status per treated county.
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Table 2.1: Balance Table: Treated v. Untreated Counties in 1984
Treated Untreated Difference
Mean S.D Counties Mean S.D Counties Mean S.E
County Characteristics:
Transfers (per capita USD1999) 144.0 [150.4] 307 147.4 [344.9] 1886 -3.37 (20.0)
Log of Transfers (per capita USD1999) 4.33 [1.31] 307 4.30 [1.31] 1886 0.027 (0.081)
Unemployment Rate 7.98 [1.84] 328 7.98 [2.27] 1892 -0.0017 (0.13)
Poverty Rate 11.9 [5.85] 328 16.8 [7.48] 1892 -4.94*** (0.43)
Population (1000) 377.3 [607.6] 307 31.7 [29.8] 1886 345.5*** (14.1)
Log of County Income 9.53 [0.19] 328 9.29 [0.18] 1892 0.24*** (0.011)
County Tax Revenue (Pc) 133.9 [116.1] 307 129.1 [130.3] 1838 4.81 (7.91)
Log of Total County Crimes (Pc) -3.36 [0.64] 328 -3.67 [0.73] 1892 0.31*** (0.043)
1960 Population Foreign Born (%) 4.62 [3.79] 328 1.77 [2.21] 1892 2.85*** (0.15)
Governor Characteristics:
Lame-Duck Governor 0.32 [0.47] 328 0.39 [0.49] 1892 -0.071** (0.029)
State Has Term Limits 0.50 [0.50] 328 0.56 [0.50] 1892 -0.065** (0.030)
Share Democratic Governor 0.66 [0.48] 328 0.78 [0.41] 1892 -0.13*** (0.025)
Governor Re-elected 0.43 [0.50] 30 0.65 [0.48] 209 -0.21** (0.094)
Percent Votes Cast For D-President 38.2 [9.62] 328 36.7 [10.3] 1892 1.52** (0.61)
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Our measure of IRCA applications per county comes from Baker (2015) who,
in turn, takes it from the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS). We also take
from Baker (2015) measures of county poverty, population, unemployment and in-
come, all of which are used as control variables in our analysis.
We aim at understanding the impact of the IRCA on the distribution of state and
local finances and the sensitivity of this impact to political constraints. We thus add
data on state and local finances taken from the US Census of Governments and use
per capita inter-governmental revenues from state governments to local governments
(counties, cities, municipalities) aggregated to the county as our dependent variable.
We also utilise a host of governor related data including party affiliation of the gover-
nor, his or her name, an indicator for whether or not a governor is a lame duck and an
indicator for whether (s)he enjoys line-item veto power in order to better understand
the responsiveness of state politicians to the IRCA. These data are obtained from the
Codebook for State Elections. We apply an instrumental variables strategy to confirm
our OLS estimates, using the share of a county’s 1960 population that is foreign-born
as an instrument for the number of documented migrants per county post-1986. This
variable is taken from the County and City Data Book prepared by the US Department
of Commerce and the Census Bureau and made available by ICSPR under Study No.
7736.
2.4.2 Inter-governmental Revenue and The Budget-Making Process
Inter-governmental revenue (IGR)
The primary dependent variable is per capita inter-governmental revenue (IGR) re-
ceived by local governments (counties, cities, municipalities, aggregated to the county)
from state governments.8 The Census Government Finance and Employment Classi-
fication Manual defines this variable as “[a]mounts received directly from the state
government, including federal aid passed through the state government and state aid
channelled through intermediate local government (e.g counties) which have no dis-
cretion as to its distribution. [It] includes state grants-in-aid, regardless of basis of
distribution.” Correspondence with staff at the Census Bureau confirms that “each
state determines what specific funding sources (if any) are used for grants to local
governments.” and that “each state determines the nature, amount and distribution
of state grants internally.”9
Local governments have few major sources of local revenue, most notably prop-
8We use inter-governmental revenue, state aid and state transfers interchangeably.
9Personal correspondence with Michael Fredericks of the Local Government Finance Statistics Branch
of the Census Bureau on 26 November 2018.
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erty taxes and, to a much lesser extent, sales taxes. Inter-governmental revenue, there-
fore, is a type of budget support for local governments which comprises, on average,
30 percent of all local government revenue as shown in Figure B.2. Importantly, the
local governments that receive this aid have “no discretion as to its distribution”. State
and federal governments decide to what areas these revenues are directed. For exam-
ple, state aid in education is intended to “support of local schools” but excludes “State
grants for libraries”. The variable at our disposal is aggregate inter-governmental rev-
enue at the county level and so it lumps together revenue intended for such areas as
health, highways, education and public welfare.10
The budget-making process
Our main contention is that state governors use their budgetary powers to allocate
more resources to newly documented migrants in the hope of winning their future
vote. A crucial question is thus how much power governors actually exert over the
budget-making process. We take up this question in this section and demonstrate that,
in fact, governors have substantial influence in the formulation and implementation
of the states fiscal priorities.11
For the vast majority of states, the budget-making process takes an entire year:
it begins sometime in July or August and for all but four states, the fiscal year begins
on 1 July.12 The state budget office is responsible for the analysis and preparation of
the budget on behalf of the governor.13 The budget-making process begins when the
state budget office requests proposals from, and provides guidance to, various state-
level agencies. This guidance typically includes state spending targets, assumptions
for inflation and priorities of the governor. In the fall, the various agencies submit
their budget proposals to the governor who reviews them and provides additional
direction. Once the governor’s recommendations are incorporated, he or she presents
the proposed budget to the state legislature in the winter season. After the legislature
passes the budget, it requires the governors signature to become law.
10Although we only observe aggregate revenue, Table B.2 in the Appendix details what is and what
is not included in the inter-governmental revenue received from the state and gives an indication as to
what types of local activity these revenues support.
11The information in this section draws from the National Association of State Budget Officers report
on the budget-making process NASBO (2015).
12In theory, 30 states operate an annual budget cycle and 20 operate a biennial budget cycle. In practice,
however, most states employ a combination of both: in those states that operate a yearly budget, it is not
uncommon for the governor to release spending recommendations for a two-year time horizon. States
on a two-yearly budget cycle, by contrast, often prepare a supplemental budget which, in many cases,
acts as a de facto yearly budget.
13The budget director is appointed directly by the governor in 34 states; in 13 states he or she is ap-
pointed by the department head and in one state the governor and department head share responsibility
for this appointment.
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Importantly, governors enjoy a number of powers over the budget-making pro-
cess, including being able to spend unanticipated funds without legislative approval
or to withhold appropriations from agencies within the executive, legislative or even
judicial branches of government. Crucially, governors enjoy various forms of veto au-
thority over the state budget. Depending on the state, governors have the authority
to either veto the entire budget or specific line-items of it, a power which gives them
great leverage over the prioritisation of the budget. Later in this chapter, we docu-
ment heterogeneity in our results depending on the extent of veto power a governor
enjoys.
2.5. Immigrant Legalisation and Inter-Governmental Revenue
2.5.1 The Evolution of IGR: Raw Data
Our aim is to understand the impact of documenting undocumented migrants on
the distribution of inter-governmental transfers from state to local governments. The
primary identifying assumption of our econometric model is that no other shocks oc-
curred around the same time as the passage of the IRCA that correlate either with
the number of legalised migrants in a given county or with the amount of inter-
governmental revenue it received from the state. Prior to estimating the parameters
of the model, therefore, it is informative to understand the evolution of IGR over time
so as to lend credence to our identifying assumption. Figure 2.5 shows the trends in
IGR as it appears in the raw data for the period between 1980 to 2000 in those coun-
ties that received applications for legal status with those that did not. As shown, the
two county types developed along similar paths prior to the passage of the IRCA in
1986 and only after the passage of the law does one observe an appreciable difference
between the two.14
As a more rigorous test for pre-treatment differences, we plot the coefficients of
an event study as specified in equation 2.2:
yc,t = δc + αt +
2000
∑
j=1980
β j
[
Tc × Djt
]
+ ec,t (2.2)
Where yc,t is per capita inter-governmental revenue from state to local govern-
ments (in 1999 USD) in county c in year t; Tc is a binary variable set to one if a county
14In Figure B.3 we show the evolution of a number of other county covariates that make clear that the
IRCA is not associated with corresponding shocks in such county characteristics as population, income,
tax revenue or public school enrolment. This is because undocumented migrants were (and still are)
included in population estimates, are eligible (especially their children) for basic public services such as
health and education and, to some extent, pay tax as some undocumented migrants obtain illegal social
security documents.
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Figure 2.5: Evolution of IGR
Note: This graph compares per capita inter-governmental revenue received in those counties that never
received applications for legal status (control) with those counties that did receive applications for legal
status (treated) through the IRCA.
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Figure 2.6: Treatment effect interacted with year dummies
Note: This graph plots the regression coefficient on a treatment indicator when it is interacted with year
dummies as specified in equation 2.2. The regression only includes county fixed effects. The outcome,
like Figure 2.5, is per capita inter-governmental revenue (in USD1999). Standard errors are clustered at
the county level and confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent. N = 43, 868.
received one or more applications for legal status post-1986 and zero otherwise; and
Djt is a dummy set to one when t = j (∀ j 6= 1986). I capture county fixed effects by
δc and time dummies by αt while ec,t is an idiosyncratic disturbance term clustered at
the county level. The results are shown in Figure 2.6, which indicate that the differ-
ence in transfers received between treated and non-treated counties shown in Figure
2.5 only becomes positive and significantly different to zero in the years after 1986,
further increasing confidence in the reasonability of our identifying assumption.
2.5.2 Baseline Estimates
We impose more structure on model 2.2 in order to estimate the parameters of a
difference-in-differences regression specification as detailed in equation 2.3.
ln(y)c,t = β0 + δc + αt + ζst + β1 · (Tc × Pt) +Θ·Xc,t + ec,t (2.3)
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Where ln(y)c,t is the natural log of per capita inter-governmental revenue from
state to local governments (in 1999 USD) in county c in year t and δc and αt are defined
as before. The treatment indicator, Tc, is now interacted with a binary variable Pt, that
is one if t ≥ 1986 and zero otherwise. In addition, we include state-by-year fixed
effects, ζst, to account for state-specific time-varying shocks that might affect legalisa-
tions and transfers, including governor specific characteristics or other state-year-level
political or economic shocks. We include a vector of county-level covariates, Xc,t, that
includes poverty and unemployment rates, income and population. As before, ec,t is
an idiosyncratic disturbance term clustered at the county level.15
The trends shown in the raw data are borne out in the regressions. Panel A of
Table 2.2 shows our results across a number of variations of the model shown in 2.3
and we see precisely estimated coefficients of similar magnitude across a number of
specifications. In Panel B, we estimate the same parameters but using a measure of
treatment intensity as specified in equation 2.4. Here, ln(IRCA + 1)c,t is the natural
log of the cumulative number of IRCA applicants per 1000 county inhabitants (plus
one) in county c in year t. The parameter of interest, β1, can be interpreted as the
elasticity of state transfers with respect to the cumulative number of per 1000 capita
legalised applicants. All other parameters are defined as before.
ln(y)c,t = β0 + δc + αt + ζst + β1 · ln(IRCA + 1)c,t +Θ·Xc,t + ec,t (2.4)
15Because our unit of observation is the county and our treatment varies at this level, we cluster stan-
dard errors at the county. The results, however, are robust to clustering at higher levels, most notably
the state. These results are captured in Table B.3 in the Appendix.
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Table 2.2: Inter-Governmental Revenue on IRCA Legalisations
Log of Inter-governmental Revenue (per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Drop Top 5 Pop < 409, 490 Matching Linear Trends
Panel A. Treatment Indicator
Treatment × Post 0.0709∗∗∗ 0.0725∗∗∗ 0.0493∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0199) (0.0193) (0.0314) (0.0241)
Panel B. Treatment Intensity
Log legalisations 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0929∗∗∗ 0.0448∗∗∗ 0.0688∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0217) (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0173)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes
County-Year Linear Trends No No No No Yes
Observations 46,820 43,952 45,132 12,042 46,820
Number of Counties 2,686 2,526 2,612 604 2,686
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to local governments (aggregated to
the county) in 1999 USD. Panel A shows results when using a treatment indicator and Panel B shows results
when using a measure of treatment intensity which is the log of the cumulative number of IRCA applications
in a given county in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). Control variables include poverty and
unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level. Standard errors
(shown in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Column 1 is our baseline estimate and suggests that counties affected by the
IRCA received, on average, 7 percent more in per capita transfers than those that did
not. Given that inter-governmental revenues make up, on average, 30 percent of lo-
cal revenue, an increase in the order of 7 percent is significant. It corresponds to an
increase of one and a half percentage points in the share of revenue received from
inter-governmental sources. Using the measure of treatment intensity, the coefficient
implies that a 1 percent increase in the number of per capita legalisations in a county
is associated with an increase in per capita transfers of about .0610 percent. Within
treated counties, moving from the 25th to 50th percentile of treatment intensity repre-
sents a 132 percent increase in per capita legalisations which translates to an increase
of about 7 percent in per capita inter-governmental revenue.16 Because treatment in-
tensity is a much more precise measure of treatment, equation 2.4 is our preferred
specification and henceforth we will use the cumulative number of per 1000 capita
IRCA applicants (plus one) as our main explanatory variable.
To ensure that our results are not driven by confounding factors, we undertake a
number of sensitivity checks. We begin by re-estimating the parameters of the model
in a sample that omits the five most treated states which, in per capita terms, corre-
spond to California, Arizona, Florida, New Jersey and Nevada.17 As shown in Col-
umn 2, the results not only hold but become slightly larger, suggesting that legal status
has a greater impact on the distribution of state finances in those states that do not ab-
sorb many newly legalised migrants. To alleviate concerns that the results are driven
by very populous cities or counties—some of which may serve as so-called ‘sanctuary
cities’—we rerun the regression, in Column 3, on a sample restricted only to those
counties with populations less than average county population size (i.e. 409,490) and
obtain precisely estimated results, albeit of slightly smaller magnitude suggesting that
the effect is strongest in more populated counties.
As shown in Figure 2.3, there are some 330 counties that received applications
for legal status and just over 2,000 that did not. One might wonder, therefore, how
comparable these two groups of counties are. To address these concerns, we use
propensity score matching to generate a more comparable control group. That is, for
every county in the sample, we generate, on the basis of its observable characteristics,
a propensity score that indicates a given county’s likelihood to be treated. Then, for
every treated county, we match the nearest neighbour from the untreated counties to
generate a more comparable control group. In Column 4, we rerun the model in this
16A very similar increase is associated with moving from the 50th to 75th percentile of treatment.
17Dropping the most treated states in terms of the absolute number of legalisations makes no differ-
ence to the results, nor does dropping the four states that border Mexico. These results are not reported.
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matched sample and obtain results almost identical to those of the baseline.18
Finally, in Column 5, we rerun the baseline specification, adding to it county
specific linear time trends. The idea here is to capture any differential trends with re-
spect to the outcome variable that might arise over time for each county, trends which
might render our identifying assumption implausible. This is the most demanding
specification. That the result holds suggests that the relationship between immigrant
legalisation and the distribution of state aid is a robust one.
2.5.3 Robustness Checks
In Table 2.3 we carry out a number of further empirical checks to test the strength of
the relationship. In Column 1 we run a first-differences estimation using only two
years in the sample: 1982 and 1992. The idea here is to skip intervening years to over-
come issues with respect to timing of various sorts: different electoral cycles in differ-
ent states, different budget response times and different IRCA application processing
times. As shown, the legalisation variable maintains its predictive power over per
capita inter-governmental revenue.19 In Column 2, we use a county’s 1980 population
to carry out all per capita calculations as another way of ensuring population changes
are not driving the results. To understand whether the relationship between immi-
grant legalisation and the distribution of state aid is linear or quadratic, we include a
quadratic term of the key explanatory variable in Column 3. As shown, the linear vari-
able retains its precision whereas the quadratic term enters imprecisely. In Column 4
we include quadratic year trends and in Column 5 we include additional county de-
mographic controls, including the share of the population that is over 18 year of age,
the share of the population that is Hispanic and the share of county households with
children. Column 6 presents results from an instrumental variables estimation which
will be explained in more detail in subsection 2.5.4.
In Table B.4, we replicate the baseline estimates using a log− linear specification
to demonstrate that the results are insensitive to the logarithmic transformation of
the data. We choose a log − log specification because (a) the legalisation variable is
unevenly distributed and (b) an elasticity is easier for interpretation.
18Changing the number of neighbours up to 5 does not change the result. Figure B.4 in the Appendix
shows the trends in inter-governmental revenue in treatment and control counties in the matched sample
using nearest neighbour matching. The characteristics on which we generated the propensity score are
county income, population, crime, tax revenue, poverty rate and unemployment in 1980. We drop state-
year fixed effects to allow for the possibility that the best-matched control county for a given treated
county may, in fact, lie in a different state. Matching within a state and leaving state-year fixed effects in
the estimation does not change the results.
19Figure B.5 plots the coefficients from a number of such regressions, each using a different time period
for the difference estimation.
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Table 2.3: Robustness Checks
Log of Inter-governmental Revenue (per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆y1992-1982 1980 PC IRCA2 Year2 Add. Controls IV
Log legalisations 0.0777∗∗∗ 0.0579∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0140) (0.0363) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0635)
Log legalisations2 -0.0140
(0.0108)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No No No Yes No
Linear Year Trends No No No Yes No No
Quadratic Year Trends No No No Yes No No
Observations 4,208 41,349 46,820 46,820 6,464 46,810
Number of Counties 2,104 2,211 2,686 2,686 2,407 2,685
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to local governments (aggregated to
the county) in 1999 USD. Log legalisations is the log of the cumulative number of IRCA applications in a
given county in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). Column 2 carries out the analysis using
per capita legalisation and per capita transfers calculated with 1980 county population in the denominator.
Additional controls in Column 5 include the share of county population that is over 18, the share of county
population that is Hispanic and the share of county households with children, which are only available for
1980, 1990 and 2000. Column 6 uses the share of foreign-born people in a county in 1960 interacted with
year dummies as an instrument for log legalisations. Control variables include poverty and unemployment
rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level. Standard errors (shown in
parentheses) are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.5.4 Instrumental Variables
As a final empirical test to rule out endogeneity arising out of geographic factors asso-
ciated with where the undocumented migrants settle, we use the share of a county’s
foreign-born population in 1960 as an instrument for the number of IRCA applicants
post-1986. In doing so, we follow a number of other studies (Hildebrandt et al., 2005;
Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010) that utilise historical
rates of migration as an instrument for present levels.
Because the instrument in question is time-invariant we interact the 1960 foreign-
born variable with year dummies in order to take advantage of the panel structure of
our data. Doing so produces results that are positive and precisely estimated, though
an order of magnitude larger than the baseline as shown in Column 6 of Table 2.3.20
2.5.5 Population Considerations
One may wonder whether our results are simply explained by a mechanical effect of
having more people in the population eligible for social programmes. We rule out this
possibility for three reasons.
First, while the IRCA legalised approximately 3 million people in some three
years, it did not lead to a corresponding increase in the population. This is because
estimates of the undocumented population are obtained from a residual of two other
population measures: (1) the total foreign-born population (obtained through the
Census) and (2) the legally resident population (known by the INS). The undocu-
mented population estimate is the residual when (2) is subtracted from (1); hence pop-
ulation estimates undertaken by the Census Bureau are inclusive of undocumented
migrants (Baker and Rytina, 2013). This fact is made evident in Figure B.3 which
shows population growth in treated and untreated counties. As illustrated, neither
type of county experienced appreciable growth in population in the years before or
after the passage of the IRCA. Accordingly, even if funds were transferred by formula
on the basis of a county’s population, the fact that there is no population growth asso-
ciated with the IRCA alleviates our concern that mechanical population forces drive
our results.
Second, a feature of the IRCA was that it “barred” the newly legalised “from
20Another option is to run 13 cross-section regressions for each year between 1988 and 2000 where each
variable is differenced from its 1982 value, as shown in specification 2.5, and the differenced variable is
then instrumented in the cross-section. The regression coefficients are plotted in Figure B.6 and confirm,
both in terms of precision and the timing of the effect, the baseline estimates shown in Figure B.5.
ln(y)c,t−1982 = β0 + βt · ln(IRCA + 1)c,t−1982 +Θt · Xc,t−1982 + ec,t (2.5)
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participation in programmes of financial assistance furnished under federal law on
the basis of financial need for a period of five years from the effective date of each
alien’s lawful temporary resident status” (DHHS, December 1991). Moreover, given
the demographic characteristics of the newly legalised discussed previously and that
the children of undocumented migrants were already eligible for public services such
as schooling pre-IRCA, we find it unlikely that our results are explained by mechani-
cal increases as a result of social assistance eligibility criteria being satisfied at the state
level.21
Third, the dependent variable used throughout our study is a measure of per
capita transfers from state to local governments. If the policy was simply associated
with a mechanical increase in transfers, we might expect the overall level of transfers
to increase but there would be no reason, ex-ante, to expect any change in the amount
of per capita transfers. That per capita transfers are a function of the number of legali-
sations in a county seems to suggest that the transfer activity we observe is more than
a mechanical increase that might arise out of a transfer formula based on population
considerations.
2.5.6 SUTVA
The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) holds that the potential outcome
of a unit of observation is unaffected by the treatment status of other units. In this
particular context, therefore, a question arises as to whether counties affected by the
IRCA receive their transfers at the expense of those counties not affected by the law or
whether these funds come from other sources. To better understand the nature of the
treatment effect, and to understand whether SUTVA holds in this particular setting,
we undertake two exercises.
First, there are four states in the sample that were unaffected by the IRCA. These
are North and South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming. As a first step, therefore, we
run the baseline specification using the treated counties from treated states and only
the control counties from these four control states. The idea here is that if the result
is reflective of a distributive politics channel where the governor takes from control
counties in order to give to treated counties, we should see no effect when we com-
pare treatment and control counties from different states. To compare counties across
state borders, we drop state-year fixed effects (and include year fixed effects instead)
and generate the results presented in Table 2.4. They indicate that, by and large, the
21Later in the paper, we utilise Census of Government expenditure data to better understand the im-
pact of legal status on various categories of local expenditure and find that the IRCA does not have a
significant impact on local welfare expenditure (as shown in Figure 2.8).
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Table 2.4: The IRCA and SUTVA
Log of Inter-governmental Revenue (per capita)
(1) (2)
Full Sample Control States
Log legalisations 0.0988∗∗∗ 0.0782∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0177)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 46,826 10,771
Number of Counties 2,686 749
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to local
governments (aggregated to the county) in 1999 USD. Log legalisations is the
log of the cumulative number of IRCA applications in a given county in a given
year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). In Column 1 we exploit the full
sample. In Column 2 we use only treated counties from treated states and the
control counties from the four control states in the sample. Control variables
include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income,
all aggregated to the county level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are
clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
treatment effect is not coming at the expense of control counties.
To probe this question further, we turn to state revenue data from the Census of
Governments. Here we observe a state’s revenues from various tax sources as well as
from the federal government by way of inter-governmental revenue from the federal
government to the state. The coefficient on per capita legalisations at the state level
shown in Table 2.5 indicates that revenue from the state increases as a function of
IRCA documented migrants in a state.22
2.6. Political Economy Mechanisms
The analysis in the preceding section demonstrated that the relationship between im-
migrant legalisation and the distribution of state finances is a robust one. In this
section, we investigate to what extent the relationship is reflective of discretionary,
political choices made by state governors and to what extent it is merely reflective
22To alleviate concerns that the result is driven by increased inter-governmental revenue from the
federal government which simply passing through the state, the Census Bureau explains that “federal
aid that is given to the state to then be distributed to local governments is normally considered state aid
because states usually have discretion over the distribution.”
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Table 2.5: State Revenues and the IRCA
Log of State Revenue From...
(1) (2) (3)
Sales Tax Income Tax Federal Gov’t
Log Legalisations, State 0.029∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.013∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.007)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 853 853 916
Number of States 41 41 44
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of state revenue from various
sources. Log legalisations, State is the log of the cumulative num-
ber of IRCA applications in a given state in a given year per 1000 state in-
habitants (plus one). We control for state unemployment, population and
income. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the state
level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
of mechanical, bureaucratic forces that oblige the governor to better service the ar-
eas where the documented migrants reside. To shed light on these issues, and on the
mechanisms that drive the result, we turn our attention to the political constraints on,
and the political context of, the state governor. The contention here is simple. If, on
the one hand, the increases in per capita transfers associated with the IRCA are the
result of mechanical forces, the results ought to be entirely insensitive to political con-
text or constraints. If, on the other hand, the transfers are the result of discretionary
choices made by state governors in an effort to bolster political support, then it is not
unreasonable to expect state aid to display some sensitivity to political context.
2.6.1 Political Party Heterogeneity
We begin by investigating the sensitivity of our results to the party affiliation of the
governor. Column 1 of Table 2.6 indicates that the per capita transfers a county re-
ceives in response to the IRCA policy are positive and significant and that this amount
increases by about half when the governor is a Democrat as compared to when he or
she is a Republican.23 In Column 2 we test whether state governors give more to coun-
ties that are politically aligned with them, in the sense that a given county’s political
23Figure B.9 and Table B.6 show, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the Democratic vote share in Presidential
elections increases as the share of IRCA migrants in a county increases.
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leaning (measured by its Presidential election results) align with those of the party of
the governor.24 As shown, state aid increases to a county affected by the IRCA re-
gardless of whether the county’s political leaning is aligned with that of the governor.
Accordingly, these results confirm that the distributional impact of the IRCA is driven
more by political factors at the state level.25
2.6.2 Term Limits and Election Cycles
Next, because our data includes the names of state governors, we are able to compare
state-to-county transfers under a single governor over time as he or she faces different
political constraints and election cycles. By way of example, we consider the transfers
in just one state, Georgia, over the political career of one of its governors, Zell Miller
(D), from 14 January 1991 to 11 January 1999. Governor Miller served two terms
in office: from 1990 to 1994 and from 1994 to 1998. Georgia has a two-term limit
constraint on the Governor.26 Therefore Zell Miller was eligible for re-election in his
first term but he was a lame duck in his second. Georgia comprises 159 counties of
which we have data for 137. From among the counties for which we have data, eight
received legalised migrants as a result of the IRCA and 129 did not. Figure 2.7 shows
the trends in transfers during Zell Miller’s tenure as Governor. As shown, the counties
that received no legalisations experienced a steady decline in the amount of per capita
transfers received. The eight counties that received legalisations, by contrast, exhibit
a great deal of variation. In Governor Miller’s first term, transfers to these counties
increase only to drop off drastically in his second term when he is no longer eligible for
re-election. The question that arises, therefore, is to what extent inter-governmental
revenue differs as governors face term limits and how much of this difference is driven
by the IRCA policy. Similarly, one wonders to what degree state aid fluctuates in the
face of gubernatorial election cycles.
The regressions in Table 2.6 investigate these questions. In Column 3, we in-
teract the legalisation variable with a binary variable that is one when the governor
is eligible for re-election and zero when (s)he is a lame duck owing to a term limit
24We use Presidential election data as a proxy for Gubernatorial electoral returns because the Guberna-
torial election data is available only as of 1990, after the variation in legalisations has ended. A county’s
Presidential election outcomes do follow its Gubernatorial outcomes quite well as shown in Figure B.8.
25In Table B.7 we explore whether the partisan composition of Congress has any explanatory power
over the results. To this purpose, we interact the legalisation variable with indicators for whether a
given state’s Members of Congress or Senators were majority Democrats or not. As shown, the party
affiliation of a states federal representatives has no explanatory power on the overall manner in which
the state budget is distributed in response to IRCA.
26In the United States 26 states had term limits from 1980 to 1986, the majority of which were limited
to 2 terms. Thereafter, the number of states with term limits increased to over 30, again the vast majority
with a 2 term limit.
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Table 2.6: Legalisation and Political Heterogeneity
Log of Inter-governmental Revenue (per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party Aligned Incentive Election Cycle
Log legalisations 0.0516∗∗∗ 0.0544∗∗∗ 0.0420∗∗∗ 0.0527∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0157)
D-Governor × Log legalisations 0.0234∗
(0.0121)
Aligned -0.000185
(0.00754)
Aligned × Log legalisations 0.0139
(0.00936)
Log legalisations × Incentive 0.0246∗∗
(0.0107)
Log legalisations × Election Year 0.0188∗∗∗
(0.00706)
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46,393 46,820 41,807 30,694
Number of Counties 2,686 2,686 2,677 2,381
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to local governments
(aggregated to the county) in 1999 USD. Log legalisations is the log of the cumulative num-
ber of IRCA applications in a given county in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus
one). D-Governor is an indicator that is 1 if the party of the governor is Democratic and 0 if
Republican. Aligned is an indicator that is 1 if the county’s election results in the most recent
Presidential election (Democrat or Republican) are aligned with the party of the Governor and
0 if not. Incentive is an indicator that is 1 if a governor is not a lame duck and 0 otherwise.
Election Year is an indicator according to whether a governor is in an election year or not. The
baseline effects of D-Governor, Incentive and Election Year are captured by state-year fixed
effects and are thus unable to be estimated. The outcome variable in Column 4 is lagged by one
year. Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of
income, all aggregated to the county level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered
at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2.7: Transfers in Zell Miller’s Georgia
Note: This graph plots inter-governmental transfers in 1999 USD in Georgia during Governor Zell
Miller’s time in office. Control counties are those that never received applications for legal status through
the IRCA whereas treated counties did receive applications for legal status through the IRCA. Georgia
comprises 157 counties of which we have data on 137: eight affected by the IRCA and 129 were not.
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and the result indicates that the difference in transfers between lame duck and non-
lame-duck governors is indeed positive and significant.27 We carry out a similar anal-
ysis in Column 4, this time analysing sensitivity to the gubernatorial election cycle.
Here, we lag the outcome variable by one year to better understand the dynamics of
inter-governmental revenue in the year prior to an election. The result suggests that
counties affected by the IRCA receive about 35 percent more in inter-governmental
revenue in the year prior to a gubernatorial election.
2.6.3 Electoral Competition
To shed further light on mechanisms, we examine the sensitivity of transfers to elec-
toral competition. The logic is similar to those of term limits. If the transfers we
observe are discretionary, we would expect more resources to flow into those counties
whose previous electoral races have been more competitive. To test this hypothe-
sis, we generate the absolute value of the winning margin between Democrats and
Republicans in the 1984 and 1988 Presidential election and identify those counties
whose win margins are tighter than the tightest 25, 10 and 5 percent of the distribu-
tion in both elections. We then interact the legalisation variable with an indicator for
whether a given county is competitive and compare this interaction across two time
periods: 1984 to 1988 when the IRCA migrants were ineligible to vote and 1988 to
1992 when the IRCA migrants were eligible to vote. Results are shown in Table 2.7
and indicate that the impact of legalisation on state-to-county transfers is amplified in
the post-1988 period when a given county is more politically contested.
2.6.4 Veto Power and State Legislatures
As mentioned earlier in the paper, governors exercise strong influence over the budget-
making process in a given state. In this subsection, we focus on arguably the most
influential of these powers: the line-item veto.28 This accords with a range of theo-
retical and empirical literature that documents the growing importance of the state
executive branch relative to the legislative branch in setting state priorities in general
(Clych and Lauth, 1991) and in shaping the state budget in particular (Kousser and
27The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to trace the evolution of transfers over the course
of a single governors term. However, one might be concerned that this specification does not allow
us to estimate a governor’s electoral incentive arising from the IRCA since the IRCA ceases to produce
meaningful variation in the number of documented migrants after 1992. To address this, we re-estimate
the parameter of interest, limiting the sample to the period only between 1989 and 1994 and compare
governors who are lame ducks in this period with those who are not. Results are shown in Table B.8 and
indicate that governors with an electoral incentive allocate significantly more resources than their lame
duck counterparts as the share of documented migrants in a county increase.
28Figure B.10 illustrates how this power has grown stronger over time.
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Table 2.7: Legalisation and Tightness-of-the-Race
Log of Inter-governmental Revenue (per capita)
(1) (2) (3)
Tightest 25% Tightest 10% Tightest 5%
Log legalisations 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0954∗∗∗ 0.0929∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0324) (0.0322)
Log legalisations × Tight25 × Post-1988 0.0698∗
(0.0364)
Log legalisations × Tight10 × Post-1988 0.0736∗
(0.0377)
Log legalisations × Tight5 × Post-1988 0.0688∗∗
(0.0350)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,585 18,585 18,585
Number of Counties 2,561 2,561 2,561
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to local governments (aggre-
gated to the county) in 1999 USD. Log legalisations is the log of the cumulative number of IRCA
applications in a given county in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). Tight25, Tight10
and Tight5 indicate, respectively, whether the outcome of the 1984 and 1988 Presidential election in a
given county was more competitive (defined as the absolute difference between votes for the Repub-
lican and Democratic candidate) than those in the 25th, 10th and 5th percentile of the competitiveness
distribution. Post-1988 is 1 for the period between 1988 and 1992 and 0 for the period from 1984 to
1988. The baseline effects of Tight25, Tight10, Tight5 are captured by county fixed effects. Control
variables include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggre-
gated to the county level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Phillips, 2012; Barrilleaux and Berkman, 2003).
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.8, we split the sample according to whether or
not the state governor enjoys line-item veto power and estimate the parameters of
our baseline specification.29 As shown, the legalisation variable has strong predictive
power over inter-governmental revenue in those states where the governor has line
item veto power.
In Column 3 of Table 2.8, we test the sensitivity of transfers to the relationship
between the state governor and the state legislature. Although governors do enjoy
increasing power over the state budget, legislatures still play a role. And if the result
is discretionary, as opposed to mechanical, we might expect it to display important
heterogeneities depending on the relationship between the executive and legislative
branches of state government. Accordingly, we generate an indicator that is one when
the party of the governor is aligned with the partisan majority of the state legislature
and zero otherwise.30 The result indicates that, although transfers increase as the share
of IRCA applicants in a county increases when there is no political alignment between
the governor and the legislature, the result increases by about 50 percent when there is
political alignment, further underscoring the politically discretionary nature of these
transfers.
2.6.5 Re-election Considerations
How might these political economy results impact a governors re-election chances?
Our data includes an indicator for whether a particular governor was re-elected and
we exploit this variable to understand whether the share of documented migrants in
a state affects re-election chances in any way. Because this outcome varies at the state
level over time, we can only include state and year fixed effects separately, denoted
by γs and αt respectively, but not jointly. Moreover, we allow for a five year lag on the
key independent variable to take into account the time it takes for the documented
migrants to earn the right to vote. Our specification is thus expressed in equation 2.6,
where Rs,t is an indicator for whether the governor in state s has been re-elected in
year t.
Rs,t = β0 + γs + αt + β1 · ln(IRCA + 1)s,t−5 +Θ·Xs,t + es,t (2.6)
The result is presented in Column 4 of Table 2.8. It suggests that as the share
of documented migrants in a state increases, so too does the governors chances for
29Specifically, we compare states where the governor has line-item veto power to states where the
governor has a simple veto, but not line-item veto.
30This includes when the state legislature is split or has a majority of the opposite party to the governor.
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Table 2.8: Veto, State Legislatures and Re-election
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Veto No Veto Alignment Re-elected
Log legalisations 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.00709 0.0535∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0301) (0.0139)
Log legalisations × Alignment 0.0245∗∗
(0.0109)
Log legalisedt−5, State 0.247∗∗∗
(0.0545)
County controls Yes Yes Yes No
State controls No No No Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No
State Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Observations 41,449 5,356 46,820 6,091
Number of Counties 2,555 670 2,686 2,239
Notes: In Columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from
state to local governments (aggregated to the county) in 1999 USD. In Column 4, the
outcome is a binary variable that is 1 if the governor is re-elected and 0 otherwise. Log
legalisations is the log of the cumulative number of IRCA applications in a given county
in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one) and Log legalisedt−5, State is
similarly defined, but aggregated at the state level and with a five year lag. Column 1
restricts the sample to those Governors who enjoy line-item veto power and Column 2 re-
stricts the sample to those Governors who enjoy no such power. Alignment is an indicator
that is one when the party of the Governor is aligned with the partisan majority of the
state legislature and 0 when it is not. The baseline effects of Aligned is captured by state-
year fixed effects and thus cannot be estimated. Control variables include poverty and
unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county
level. State controls are the same, but aggregated to the state level for the specification in
Column 4 and also include the party of the governor. Standard errors (shown in paren-
theses) are clustered at the county level in Columns 1 to 3 and at the state level in Column
4. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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re-election, lending further credence to the political economy nature of our baseline
results.31
2.7. Capturing the Vote of the Newly Legalised
Thus far, we have demonstrated a robust relationship between immigrant legalisa-
tion and the distribution of public resources. Governors allocate more resources to
counties as the share of newly documented migrants in those counties increase, an
allocation which is particularly sensitive to the political context of the incumbent. Un-
til now, however, we have implicitly assumed that the inter-governmental revenue is
intended to capture the vote of the migrants who obtained legal status through the
IRCA. Of course, because the inter-governmental revenue we observe is aggregated
at the county level, we are unable to verify with certainty which constituents these
monies are actually intended to reach.32 In this section, therefore, we present a num-
ber of pieces of evidence that demonstrate that it is indeed the IRCA migrants who
motivate the state governor.
2.7.1 Attitudes Towards Migrants
Like today, undocumented migration was a politically charged issue at the time of
the IRCA. A notable opponent of the IRCA, and of undocumented migration more
generally, was Governor Pete Wilson, Republican governor of California, who ran a
campaign of fear and anti-migrant propaganda.33 In his 1994 re-election campaign,
Governor Wilson pinned his hopes onto Proposition 187, the “Save Our State” bal-
31One question that might arise is how visible these transfers are in the sense of their ability to influ-
ence public opinion about the incumbent. In this respect, an assumption in our conceptual framework
is that voting decisions in a county are based on local economic conditions and that voters base their
decision not just on local conditions immediately prior to the election but rather throughout the term
of the governor. In the terminology of Elinder, Jordahl and Poutvaara (2015), voters in our framework
base their decisions retrospectively (i.e. based on the implemented policies of the incumbent) rather than
prospectively (i.e. based on the promises candidates make). In Table B.9 we investigate how the allo-
cation on state aid affects local spending and the coefficient suggests that across all categories of local
spending, the elasticity of such spending with respect to state aid is positive and precisely estimated,
indicating that these transfers are visibly felt at the local level.
32Moreover, because this revenue is dedicated to such purposes as health and road improvements, the
governor can use it to win over several constituents and not just a single one. Indeed, a key difference
between the governor and his or her legislative counterparts is that the governor can shape a states fiscal
priorities so as to build winning coalitions from among otherwise competing constituents; legislators
on the other hand often vote over single issues, increasing the likelihood of generating ’winners’ and
’losers’ from any given vote (Cascio and Washington, 2014).
33In a dramatic re-election advertisement, Governor Wilson states “I’m suing to force the Fed-
eral Government to control the border and I’m working to deny state services to illegal im-
migrants. Enough is enough.” (Transcribed from the Television Ad which can be found at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lLIzzs2HHgY. Accessed 8 March 2018.
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lot initiative, and the Republican Party offered ideological and financial backing to
see the proposition go through. Proposition 187 prohibited undocumented migrants
from using non-emergency public services and required the providers of such ser-
vices to immediately report undocumented migrants for deportation. It was passed
by California’s voters only to be struck down by a federal court. The proposition, and
Wilson’s campaign to support it, was highly controversial and left somewhat of an
enduring legacy. Bowler, Nicholson and Segura (2006), for example, find that racially
charged ballot initiatives in California—and specifically Proposition 187—are signif-
icantly associated with a shift in political support away from the Republican party
and towards the Democratic party on behalf of non-Hispanic white voters as well as
Latino voters.
In light of this political context, it seems reasonable to ask to what degree our
results are actually driven by governors catering to anti-migrant sentiment arising
out of the IRCA rather than to the needs of the documented migrants themselves.
We examine this question first by quantifying the impact of Governor Wilson’s term
in office and of Proposition 187 on state aid. In Column 1, therefore, we restrict the
sample to consider only California during the eight years for which Governor Wilson
was in power (1991 to 1998) and exploit variation in county-level voting outcomes for
Proposition 187. Forty-seven of California’s 55 counties voted for the Proposition and
eight rejected it and the results varied from as little as 29 percent in favour to as much
as 77 percent. Perhaps unsurprisingly, counties more affected by the IRCA received
less inter-governmental revenue during Governor Wilson’s tenure. However, this re-
sult wiped away and made positive for counties with a vote share of 49.5 percent or
higher. However, neither of the coefficients are precisely estimated, which suggests
that the impact of immigrant legalisation on state aid is not, in California at least, con-
founded by anti-migrant sentiment. In Column 2 we estimate the parameters of the
baseline specification excluding California, the state with the strongest expression of
anti-migrant sentiment at the time and the results hold. In the years following propo-
sition 187, ten other states passed ballot initiatives or laws similar to that of Propo-
sition 187.34 Dropping these states from the analysis—presumably the states where
governors had the strongest incentives to cater to anti-migrant sentiment—does not
alter the results in any meaningful way.
34These are Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ok-
lahoma and Texas as reported by Richard Lacayo (December 19, 2004) in the following report:
https://ti.me/2PbD7YE.
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Table 2.9: IRCA and Anti-Migrant Sentiment
Log of Inter-governmental Revenue (per capita)
(1) (2) (3)
Wilson No Cali No Anti-Migrant States
Log legalisations -1.844 0.0834∗∗∗ 0.0579∗∗
(1.601) (0.0182) (0.0238)
Log legalisations × Prop 187 VS 0.0372
(0.0241)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 428 45,690 32,232
Number of Counties 54 2,632 1,864
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to local governments
(aggregated to the county) in 1999 USD. Log legalisations is the log of the cumulative num-
ber of IRCA applications in a given county in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus
one). Prop187 VS is the county vote share for Proposition 187. Control variables include
poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the
county level. Column 3 excludes the 10 states (plus California) that passed ballot initiatives
or laws similar in spirit to those of Proposition 187. Standard errors (shown in parentheses)
are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.10: The IRCA and Attitudes towards Migration (GSS Survey)
Attitudes on Undocumented Migrants Attitudes on Documented Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Given Work Permits Work Hard Deported Increase Crime Take Jobs Away
Log legalisations 1.669∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ -1.818∗ -3.673∗ -3.760∗
(0.718) (0.130) (0.815) (1.698) (1.858)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No No No
Region Fixed Effects No Yes No No No
Observations 873 16,179 705 581 639
Number of Regions 9 9 9 9 9
Years in Sample 1994 1980 — 1998 1996 1996 1996
Notes: This table uses General Social Survey (GSS) data merged with the legalisation data. Log legalisations is the log
of the cumulative number of IRCA applications in a given region in a given year per 1000 region inhabitants (plus one).
The outcome variables are all binary indicators on various attitudes towards documented and undocumented migrants.
Control variables include individual income, employment status, marital status, age, educational attainment and race.
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the region level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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As a more general check, we merge the legalisation variable with data from
the General Social Survey (GSS), which includes a range of questions on attitudes to-
wards migration. As indicated in the various columns of Table 2.10, a higher share of
legalised migrants in a region tends to improve, not worsen, attitudes towards doc-
umented and undocumented migrants. Individuals residing in such regions tend to
think undocumented migrants work hard, deserve work permits and ought to be pro-
tected against deportation. Such individuals are also of the opinion that documented
migrants neither increase crime nor take jobs away from native citizens. Given these
attitudes, and given the fact that the IRCA was not associated with an influx of mi-
gration but rather a change in the legal status of already resident migrants, we find it
unlikely that state aid in IRCA-affected counties is intended to satisfy nativist senti-
ment or general opposition to the amnesty.
2.7.2 The IRCA, Local Expenditure and Hispanic Outcomes
Finally, we turn our attention from county revenue to county expenditure in an effort
to better understand in which areas and, potentially, on which constituents county
revenue is spent. Figure 2.8 plots event study estimates when the legalisation intensity
in 1992 is interacted with year dummies in regressions with various categories of local
expenditure as the outcome. These figures suggest that the IRCA led to increases in
local expenditure in the areas of health, education and welfare but that these increases
are estimated with precision for education expenditure beginning in 1991.
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Figure 2.8: Event study estimates of local expenditure on legalisation
Note: This graph plots the regression coefficient on the log of the cumulative number of IRCA applica-
tions in a given county per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one) in 1992 when it is interacted with year
dummies. The outcome variables are the log of per capita county expenditure in health, education,
welfare and highways and roads. The regressions control for poverty and unemployment rates, log of
population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level as well as county and state-by-year
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and confidence intervals are drawn at 95
percent. N = 34, 840 for all regressions.
To understand whether these educational expenditures were intended to benefit
the newly documented migrants and/or their families, we calculate race-specific high
school completion rates to test whether the counties that were affected by the IRCA
also experienced improvements in Hispanic high school completion. To carry out
this exercise, we obtain data from the 2010 decennial census in order to estimate the
impact of the IRCA on an individual’s educational outcomes. Rather than compare
individuals in treated and non-treated counties before and after the passage of the
IRCA, we now compare individuals in treated and non-treated counties in cohorts
that entered middle school before the passage of the IRCA (and hence were less likely
to benefit from additional educational expenditure) with those cohorts that entered
middle school after the IRCA passed (and hence were more likely to benefit from
additional funds). Accordingly, we construct 13 middle school entry cohorts from
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1980 to 1992. An individual in the 2010 census is placed in a middle school entry
cohort depending on which year he or she was 12 years of age. The specification is
detailed in equation 2.7, where Hi,c,mse is an indicator if individual i in county c and in
middle school entry cohort mse has 12 years of education or more. County and middle
school entry cohort fixed effects are captured by δc and ψmse, respectively and D
j
mse is
an indicator that is one when j = mse and zero otherwise ∀ j 6= 7. All other terms are
defined as before.
Hi,c,mse = β0 + δc + ψmse +
13
∑
j=1
β j
[
ln(IRCA + 1)c,1992 × Djmse
]
+ ec,mse (2.7)
We first run the specification on a sample of only Hispanic individuals and then
on a sample of only Caucasian persons and plot the corresponding coefficient, β j, as
shown in Figure 2.9. This coefficient estimates the change in the slope of high school
completion between individuals in high and low treatment intensity counties across
various middle school entry cohorts. The event study estimates indicate that for His-
panic persons, residing in a county affected by the IRCA led to a positive and sig-
nificant impact on that person’s likelihood of completing high school, provided they
entered middle school in 1991 or 1992. Indeed, there is no distinguishable difference
in the likelihood of completing high school between individuals in high-treated and
low-treated counties if they began middle school prior to this time. The timing of this
effect suggests that the increased high school completion rates arise not just from le-
gal status but from additional resources that these counties receive for education. For
Caucasians individuals, by contrast, residing in an IRCA-affected county has no dis-
tinguishable impact on high school completion probability, regardless of when they
began middle school. These results lend further credence to our hypothesis that state
politicians targeted newly documented migrants.3536
35The results are even stronger when comparing individuals across different elementary school entry
cohorts (i.e. the year in which an individual was six years of age) and are shown in Figure B.13.
36In the Appendix, we also try to understand the electoral relevance of the IRCA. To address this, we
obtain individual-level data from the November voter supplement of the CPS which includes indicators
for whether a person voted in the November election. Our aim is to understand how individual voting is
affected by both the IRCA and inter-governmental revenue. We thus plot the marginal effect of the IRCA
on the propensity of an individual to vote along the distribution of inter-governmental revenue as shown
in Figure B.12. Importantly, though, we have data for only three periods: 1996, 1998 and 2000 because
the CPS does not include county identifiers for earlier time periods. As such, these results include no
pre-treatment observations and ought to be taken as suggestive. Table B.10 presents the results of the
margins plot in table form along with other results from the CPS.
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Figure 2.9: Event study estimates of high school completion on legalisation
Note: This graph plots the regression coefficient on legalisation intensity in 1992 when it is interacted
with middle school entry cohort dummies as shown in equation 2.7. A person is placed in a middle
school entry cohort depending on the year in which they were 12 years of age. The outcome variable,
taken from the 2010 decennial census, is an indicator that is one if an individual in a given county and
middle school entry cohort completed high school or more and zero otherwise. The regressions include
county and cohort fixed effects. The panel on the left plots coefficients when the sample is restricted
only to Hispanic individuals whereas the figure on the right estimates the coefficients on a sample of
only Caucasian individuals. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and confidence intervals
are drawn at 90 percent. For the Hispanic sample, N = 52, 222 whereas for the Caucasian sample
N = 133, 907.
2.8. Conclusion
Undocumented migration in the United States has become a deeply polarised issue.
In this chapter, we set out to investigate the distributional consequences of giving un-
documented migrants legal status through a nation-wide amnesty programme. Our
contention has been that state governors allocate more resources to those counties
where the newly documented migrants reside in an effort to win over their future
political support. We substantiated this hypothesis in parts.
First, we found that documenting migrants does indeed have a significant dis-
tributional component. Across a number of specifications, our results consistently
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demonstrate that as the share of documented migrants in a county increases, so too
does the amount of per capita aid received by that county from its respective state
government.
Second, in trying to understand why legal status affects the distribution of pub-
lic finances, we uncovered political economy forces at work. We presented evidence
that the allocation of state aid that arises out of the IRCA varies significantly according
to the political context in which an incumbent governor finds him or herself. Gover-
nors transfer more resources to IRCA-affected counties when the governor is eligible
for re-election, when the county is more politically contested, when the governor en-
joys line-item veto power over the state budget and when the legislative and executive
branches of state government are politically aligned. These results are especially note-
worthy as it suggests that the relationship between legal status and the distribution
of public resources is one of discretionary political choice rather than one of economic
necessity or mechanical welfare increases.
In the final part of our analysis, we addressed the question of whether—and to
what extent—state governors actually targeted resources to capture the political sup-
port of the newly documented migrants rather than that of other, perhaps compet-
ing, voting groups. In this respect, we exploited data from a key anti-migrant ballot
measure as well as from survey data on attitudes and found little evidence of anti-
migrant sentiment confounding our results. Lastly, we found that county expenditure
in education increases significantly in IRCA-affected counties and that, consequently,
Hispanic individuals, as compared to Caucasian ones, residing in those same coun-
ties experience significant improvements in educational outcomes, further suggesting
that the resource allocation arising out of the IRCA is intended to service the needs,
and win the political support, of the newly documented migrants.
On the whole, then, our findings point to a significant political economy di-
mension to immigrant legalisation. Offering legal status not only leads to various so-
cial and economic improvements at the local level but also provides politicians with
strong electoral incentives to see that it does so.
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Appendix B
B.1 Analysis of the Model
Our analysis begins by taking first order conditions of equation 2.1 with respect to g:
∂Π
∂g
∣∣∣∣
g=g∗
= (1− α)U′C(g∗) + αU′L(g∗) + E ·
∂Ω
∂φ
· ∂φ
∂g∗
− C′(g∗) != 0 (8)
To understand how g∗ responds to a sudden shock in legal status, α, we maxi-
mize 8 and this is implicitly given by the following:
∂g∗
∂α
= −U
′
L(g
∗)−U′C(g∗) + E ·
∂ ∂Ω∂φ
∂φ
∂g
∂α
∂2Π
∂g2
∣∣∣
g=g∗
(9)
Because ∂
2Π
∂g2 < 0 the sign in front of equation 9 becomes positive. Moreover, we
have assumed that U′L(g) > U
′
C(g) ∀ g; accordingly, the first term in the numerator,
U′L(g
∗)−U′C(g∗) > 0. The overall sign of equation 9 thus hinges on the sign of the
second term in the numerator which can be expressed as follows:
∂ ∂Ω∂φ
∂φ
∂g
∂α
=
∂ ∂Ω∂φ
∂α
· ∂φ
∂g
+
∂Ω
∂φ
·
∂
∂φ
∂g
∂α
(10)
Rewriting
∂ ∂Ω∂φ
∂α =
∂ ∂Ω∂φ
∂α · ∂φ∂φ = ∂
2Ω
∂φ2
· ∂φ∂α , and
∂
∂φ
∂g
∂α =
∂
∂φ
∂g
∂α · ∂g∂g = ∂
2φ
∂g2 ·
∂g
∂α we can
substitute these back into equation 10 to obtain:
=
∂2Ω
∂φ2
· ∂φ
∂α
· ∂φ
∂g
+
∂Ω
∂φ
· ∂
2φ
∂g2
· ∂g
∂α
=
∂2Ω
∂φ2
· ∂φ
∂α
· ∂φ
∂g
· ∂g
∂g
+
∂Ω
∂φ
· ∂
2φ
∂g2
· ∂g
∂α
=
∂2φ
∂g2
· ∂g
∂α
· (∂2Ω
∂φ2
+
∂Ω
∂φ
)
Under the assumption that ∂Ω∂φ > | ∂
2Ω
∂φ2
|, the overall sign of equation 10 is thus
positive. This in turn allows us to state that ∂g
∗
∂α > 0.
37
37Although we have used a general functional form for Ω, for illustrative purposes, we set Ω(φ) =
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Prediction 1: The optimal allocation of state aid increases in the share of newly
documented migrants in a county.
Given that the second term in the numerator in equation 9 is positive, we can
state that ∂g
∗
∂α
∣∣∣
E=1
> ∂g
∗
∂α
∣∣∣
E=0
.
Prediction 2: The optimal allocation of state aid is larger when P is eligible for
re-election and less when (s)he is a lame duck.
Finally, the functional form of Ω(φ) leads us to a final testable prediction. Be-
cause φ = φT represents an inflection point (where φT represents the winning thresh-
old of an election), it follows that ∂Ω∂φ is maximized as φ→ φT.
Prediction 3: The optimal allocation of state aid becomes larger the closer the
P’s expected vote share is to the winning threshold.
1
1+e−φ and plot the various derivatives of Ω(φ), shown in Figure B.1, to provide some intuition behind
this assumption.
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B.2 Additional Figures
Ω(φ)
Ω'(φ)
Ω''(φ)
φT
Expected Vote Share
Ω'(φ) + Ω''(φ)
φT
Expected Vote Share
Figure B.1: Functional form of Ω(φ), its first and second derivative and their sum
Note: This graph plots, clockwise from top-left: Ω(φ); Ω′(φ); Ω′′(φ); and Ω′(φ) +Ω′′(φ)
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Figure B.2: Sources of local government revenue
Note: This graph plots the share of local government revenue (cities, municipalities and counties aggre-
gated to the county) coming from state transfers and state and federal transfers.
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Figure B.3: Trends in county socio-economic characteristics
Note: This graph compares the evolution of various county characteristics in those counties that never
received applications for legal status (control) with those counties that did receive applications for legal
status (treated) through the IRCA.
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Figure B.4: Evolution of inter-governmental revenues in matched sample
Note: This graph compares per capita inter-governmental revenues (in USD1999) in those counties that
never received applications for legal status (control) with those counties that did receive applications
for legal status (treated) through the IRCA in a sample of treated and control counties matched on the
basis of propensity scores using the nearest neighbour. The county characteristics on which we base
the propensity score matching are county income, population, crime, tax revenue, poverty rate and
unemployment in 1980.
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Figure B.5: First-difference coefficient estimates
Note: This graph plots the coefficients from various first-difference regressions from 1988 to 2000 using
1982 as the base year. The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to local gov-
ernments (in 1999 USD) and β is the coefficient on the natural log of the cumulative number of IRCA
applicants per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). Control variables include poverty and unemployment
rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level. County fixed effects and
state-year fixed effects are also included in the estimations. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level and confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent.
78 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRIBUTION
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
β IR
CA
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Year
Figure B.6: Instrumental variables regression coefficients
Note: This graph plots β from 13 cross section regressions as specified in equation 2.5, one regression
each for the years between 1988 and 2000. For each year, the value of the covariates is differenced
from their 1982 value. The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to county
governments (in 1999 USD) and β is the coefficient on the natural log of the cumulative number of IRCA
applicants per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one) when it is instrumented by the 1960 share of a county
that is foreign-born. Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and
log of income, all aggregated to the county level. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and
confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent.
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Figure B.7: Naturalisation and legalisation at the state level
Note: This graph plots trends in naturalisations and legalisations at the state level. Lines drawn at 1986
(the passage of the IRCA), 1992 (first cohort of naturalisations arising from the IRCA) and 1996.
Source: Immigration and Naturalisation Services, own data.
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Figure B.8: Presidential and Gubernatorial election results
Note: These Figures plot the Democratic vote share at the county level in Presidential and Gubernatorial
elections beginning in 1992. The scatter on the left plots the raw data while the scatter on the right plots
the variables once state-year fixed effects and county fixed effects have been accounted for.
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Figure B.9: The IRCA and the Democratic vote share
Note: The panel on left plots the Democratic vote share at the county level in Presidential elections in
counties affected by the IRCA against those not affected by the IRCA. The panel on the right shows
coefficients from a regression where Democratic vote share (in Presidential elections) is regressed on an
interaction between a treatment indicator and year. Control variables include poverty and unemploy-
ment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level as well as county fixed
effects and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and confidence
intervals are drawn at 95 percent. N = 12, 754
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Figure B.10: Governor veto power index over time
Note: This graph plots an index of veto power enjoyed by state governors over time. The index is in-
terpreted as follows: 5 Governor has item veto and a special majority vote of the legislature is needed
to override a veto [three-fifths of the legislators elected or two-thirds of the legislators present]; 4.5 Gov-
ernor has item veto, with a majority of legislators elected needed to override, except for appropriations
bills when votes of two-thirds of those elected are needed to override; 4 Governor has item veto with
a majority of legislators elected needed to override; 3 Governor has item veto with only a majority of
legislators present needed to override; 2 Governor has no item veto, with a special legislative majority
needed to override; 1 Governor has no item veto, with only a simple majority needed to override; 0
Governor has no veto of any kind.
Source: Thad L. Beyle
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Figure B.11: Share of local expenditure on...
Note: This graph plots various categories of local government expenditure as a share of total local ex-
penditure.
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Figure B.12: Marginal effect of the IRCA on the propensity to vote
Note: This graph plots the marginal effect of immigrant legalisation on the propensity to vote when
immigrant legalisation is interacted with inter-governmental revenue from the state. In other words, it
plots ∂vote∂IRCA = βIRCA + βIRCA×transfers ∗ transfers along the distribution of inter-governmental revenue.
βIRCA is the coefficient on the log of the cumulative number of IRCA applications in a given county in
a given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). The regression draws on individual data from the
1996, 1998 and 2000 November Voter Supplement of the CPS. The outcome variable is an indicator that
is one if an individual voted in that year’s November election and zero otherwise. Control variables
include individual race, sex, family income, marital status, education and age as well as year dummies
and county population. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and confidence intervals are
drawn at 95 percent. N = 41, 968.
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Figure B.13: Event study estimates of high school completion on legalisation
Note: This graph plots the regression coefficient on legalisation intensity in 1992 when it is interacted
with elementary school entry cohort dummies. A person is placed in a elementary school entry cohort
depending on the year in which they were six years of age. The outcome variable, taken from the 2010
decennial census, is an indicator that is one if an individual in a given county and middle school entry
cohort completed high school and zero otherwise. The regressions include county and cohort fixed
effects. The panel on the left plots coefficients when the sample is restricted only to Hispanic individuals
whereas the figure on the right estimates the coefficients on a sample of only Caucasian individuals.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level and confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent. For
the Hispanic sample, N = 53, 580 whereas for the Caucasian sample N = 126, 493.
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B.3 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Congressional Vote Record on the IRCA Bill
House Senate
Yes 274 63
(204-D; 70-R) (34-D; 29-R)
No
132 24
(33-D; 99-R) (5-D; 8-R)
Abstain 26 13
Notes: This table shows how the 99th
Congress voted for the IRCA Bill on 17 Oc-
tober 1986.
Source: Congressional Votes Database ac-
cessed at govtrack.us
Table B.2: Inter-governmental Revenue from State to Local Governments: Categories of Revenue
Education Health and Hospitals Highways Public Welfare
Includes State aid for support of local
schools; redistribution of fed-
eral aid for education; hand-
icapped, special, and voca-
tional education and rehabil-
itation; student transporta-
tion; equalization aid; school
health; local community col-
leges; adult education; school
buildings; and property tax
relief related strictly to school
funding.
State aid for local health pro-
grammes; maternal and child
health; alcohol, drug abuse,
and mental health; environ-
mental health; nursing aid;
hospital financing (including
construction); and hospital-
ization of patients in local
government hospitals.
State aid for construction, im-
provement, or maintenance
of streets, highways, bridges,
tunnels, etc.; distribution of
state fuel taxes; and aid for
debt service on local highway
debt.
State aid for public wel-
fare purposes; medical care
and related administration
under public assistance pro-
grammes (including Medi-
caid) even if received by
a public hospital; care in
nursing homes not associated
with hospitals; federal cate-
gorical assistance (e.g., pass
through of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, or
AFDC); and administration
of local welfare programmes.
Excludes State grants for libraries; state
expenditures on behalf of
local schools for textbooks,
buses, school buildings, etc.;
and value of donated food
commodities (non-revenue).
State aid for medical care
under public assistance pro-
grammes such as Medicaid.
State grants for urban mass
transit
Notes: This table explains for what purposes inter-governmental revenue from state to local governments (counties, cities, municipalities aggregated to the
county) is used for. We only observe these revenues in aggregate at the county level and do not observe the categories. This information is simply informa-
tive to give the reader an idea of the sorts of things a state governor can and cannot support with state-to-county transfers.
Source: Information taken from The Census Government Finance and Employment Classification Manual which can be accessed at:
https://www.census.gov/govs/www/classrevdef.html
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Table B.3: Baseline Results with Alternative Clustering and Inference
(1) (2)
Treatment × Post Legalisation Intensity
β̂ 0.0709 0.0610
p-values:
A. Analytical values
(clustered at the state level) 0.0325 0.0149
B. Wild Bootstrap values
(clustered at the state level) 0.0521 0.0390
Observations 46,820 46,820
Number of States 46 46
Notes: This table presents the baseline estimates (Column 1 of Table 2.2) clustering
the standard errors at the state level. p-values are derived both analytically, using
Stata’s conventional vce(cluster state) command as well as through Wild cluster
bootstrapping generated using Roodman et al. (2018) boottest command.
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Table B.4: Baseline Results using Linear Legalisations
Log of Inter-governmental Revenue (per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Drop Top 5 Pop < 409,490 Matching Linear Trends
Legalisations per 1,000 capita 0.00551∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.00370∗∗∗ 0.00557∗∗∗ 0.00412∗∗∗
(0.00149) (0.00332) (0.00140) (0.00164) (0.00158)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Linear Year Trends No No No No Yes
Observations 46,820 43,952 45,132 12,042 46,820
Number of Counties 2,686 2,526 2,612 604 2,686
Notes: This table replicates the baseline estimation reported in Panel B of Table 2.2 but using the cumulative number
of IRCA applications from a given county in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants as the key independent
variable without a log transformation. The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to local
governments aggregated to the county in 1999 USD. Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates,
log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses)
are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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State Legalisation Impact Assistance Grants (SLIAG)
Section 204 of the IRCA outlines the details associated with the State Legalisation
Impact Assistance Grants (SLIAG)—a $1B per year federal funding programme for
four years which could be spent over seven years until 1994. SLIAG was designed to
compensate states for the extra costs they would incur as a result of the legalisation
programme of the IRCA. Specifically, SLIAG funds were intended to assist states to
defray expenses in the areas of public health, public assistance and education (Liu
(1991); DHHS (December 1991)). It is unlikely that the SLIAG funds are confound-
ing our results for the simple reason that SLIAG was administered through an en-
tirely separate institutional set-up and is not part of the inter-governmental revenue
outcome variable that we exploit.38 Nevertheless, we obtain the amount of funding
states received from SLIAG and deduct it from our main outcome variable to create an
‘inter-governmental revenue net of SLIAG’ variable. Results are shown in Table B.5
and confirm that the resource allocation to affected counties is not being confounded
by SLIAG funds.
38As part of the IRCA, The federal government instituted the Single Point of Contact (SPOC) system,
whereby every state designated its own SPOC so as to create “state-level lead implementation agencies
to manage the [SLIAG] programme according to the unique needs and arrangements of the individu-
als states” Liu (1991). At the federal level, it was the Department of Health and Human Services that
received applications for and disbursed the SLIAG funds but SLIAG required that SPOCs coordinate
directly with state and local public health, public assistance and education organisations to receive the
funds Liu (1991).
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Table B.5: Transfers on IRCA Legalizations net of SLIAG Funds
(1)
Net Transfers PC
Log legalisations 0.398∗∗∗
(0.0807)
Control Variables Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 6,490
Number of Counties 2238
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per
capita transfers from state to county governments
in 1999 USD net of SLIAG funds received from the
federal government. Log legalisations is the
log of the cumulative number of IRCA legalised
migrants in a given county in a given year per
1000 county inhabitants (plus one). SLIAG was
made available until 1991 and so our net transfers
variable is defined only until that period which
explains the smaller number of county-year ob-
servations. Control variables include poverty and
unemployment rates, log of population and log of
income, all aggregated to the county level. Stan-
dard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered
at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table B.6: Democratic Vote Share on IRCA Legalisations
Democratic Vote Share
(1) (2) (3)
All States D State R State
Log legalisationst−5 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗
(0.00175) (0.00333) (0.00206)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,789 4,203 3,586
Number of Counties 2,141 1,127 1,014
Notes: The dependent variable is the Democratic vote share, at the
county level, in Presidential elections. Log legalisationst−5 is a
five year lag of the log of the cumulative number of IRCA applica-
tions from a given county in a given year per 1000 county inhabi-
tants (plus one). In Columns 2 and 3 we split the sample and look
at the relationship only in Democratic (Column 2) or Republican
(Column 3) states defined by the party of the Governor in the year
1990. Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates,
log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county
level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the
county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.7: Legalisation and Dynamics of the 99th Congress
Log of Inter-governmental Revenue (per capita)
(1) (2)
Log legalisations 0.0442∗∗ 0.0444∗
(0.0221) (0.0248)
Log legalisations ×Majority D-Senators in State 0.0201
(0.0275)
Log legalisations ×Majority D-Members in State 0.0189
(0.0293)
Control Variables Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 46,820 46,820
Number of Counties 2,686 2,686
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to county governments in 1999 USD.
Log legalisations is the log of the cumulative number of IRCA applications from a given county in a given
year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). Majority D-Senators in State is an indicator that is 1 if both
senators of a given state are Democrats and 0 otherwise. Majority D-Members in State is defined similarly: it
is 1 if the majority of congress members from a given state were Democrats and 0 otherwise. Control variables
include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county
level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table B.8: Legalisation and Term limits
Log of IGR (per capita)
(1)
Incentive
Log legalisations 0.254
(0.197)
Log legalisations × Electoral Incentive 0.0923∗∗∗
(0.0241)
Control Variables Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 12,134
Number of Counties 2,384
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state
to county governments in 1999 USD. Log legalisations is the log of
the cumulative number of IRCA applications from a given county in a
given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). Electoral Incentive
is an indicator that is 1 if a governor is not a lame duck in the period be-
tween 1989 and 1994 and zero otherwise. The baseline effect of Electoral
Incentive is captured by state-year fixed effects and is thus unable to be
estimated. Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates,
log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level.
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the county level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.9: Local Spending and IRCA Legalisations
Log of Per Capita Local Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Health Education Welfare Highway
Log of Transfers 0.254∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.0435∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0228) (0.0113) (0.0199) (0.0193)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36,869 36,869 36,869 36,869 36,869
Number of Counties 2,638 2,638 2,638 2,638 2,638
p-values:
A. Unadjusted 9.8e-42 8.0e-35 .00011 2.0e-24 6.8e-36
B. Westfall & Young Adjusted 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: This table presents regression results using various categories of per capita local govern-
ment expenditure as the outcome variable. Log of Transfers is the per capita inter-governmental
revenue from the state to local governments aggregated to the county in 1999 USD. The adjusted
p-values in the last row are adjusted to take into account potential multiple hypothesis testing us-
ing Westfall and Young (1993) family-wise error rate procedure. Control variables include poverty
and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level.
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table B.10: The IRCA, Citizenship and Voter Turnout using CPS
(1) (2) (3)
Naturalised Voted in Nov Voted in Nov
Log legalisations 0.0221∗∗∗ -0.0060 -0.0770∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0207)
Log of Transfers -0.0086
(0.0085)
Log Legalisation × Log Transfers 0.0126∗∗∗
(0.0036)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50,206 46,210 41,968
Notes: This table presents regression results using individual data from the 1996, 1998 and
2000 November Voter Supplement of the CPS. Log legalisations is the log of the cumu-
lative number of IRCA applications from a given county in a given year per 1000 county
inhabitants (plus one). Log Transfers is the per capita inter-governmental revenue from
the state government to the county in 1999 USD. Column 1 has an outcome variable that
is 1 if an individual is a naturalised citizen and 0 if (s)he is a native citizen. Columns 2
and 3 have as outcome variables indicators that are 1 if an individual voted in that year’s
November election and 0 if (s)he did not. The years for which we have data include three
major gubernatorial election cycles as well as two Presidential elections but we cannot
distinguish which election an individual voted for. Control variables include individual
race, sex, family income, marital status, education and age. Standard errors (shown in
parentheses) are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Chapter 3
Legal Status and Political Representation: The 1986
IRCA and Hispanic Public Officials
3.1. Introduction
Recent midterm elections in the United States have been distinguished for producing
the youngest and most diverse group of federal representatives to serve the country
(Manning, 2018; Jin, 2019). Still, just 46 of the new members elected to Congress in
the 2016 midterm elections were Hispanic, comprising approximately eight percent of
that body even though Hispanic people make up about 18 percent of the United States
population (Manning, 2018). For comparative purposes, the same midterm elections
saw 52 African Americans assume public office while their share of the population
stands at just over 13 percent (Jin, 2019).1 Given that there are a number of studies
that document the impact of a politician’s identity and individual characteristics on
his or her policy choices (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Pande, 2003; Levitt, 1996;
Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2011), an important question is what factors
determine who gets elected to office.
Models of political selection suggest that candidates are selected to public office
either on account of individual characteristics that make them particularly compe-
tent to implement policy (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Besley et al., 2017; Besley and
Reynal-Querol, 2011) or on account of their ability to represent a wider range of pol-
icy preferences (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). Although some
empirical work has shown that it is possible to for representative democracy to ac-
commodate politicians of both high ability and broad representation (Dal Bó et al.,
2017), citizen-candidate models in the spirit of Besley and Coate (1997) predict that
the competence-representation dilemma is especially pronounced when capacity for
1Estimates of both the Hispanic and African American share in the population come from the Census
Bureau Quick Facts Website: https://bit.ly/2GXW8JW. Accessed 7 March 2019.
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policy-making is clustered among groups with specific policy preferences: in such
cases, the electorate may very well sacrifice policy ability in favour of a candidate that
better represents their interests.
In this chapter, I test whether documenting undocumented migrants—and even-
tually enfranchising them—affects the ethnic identity of those who assume public of-
fice and if so, whether it does on account of candidate competence or on account of
better representation. To do so, I combine quasi-experimental variation in legal status
arising from the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) with newly digi-
tised data that contains information on over 43,000 Hispanic individuals elected to
public office in the United States from 1984 to 1994. The IRCA legalised, and offered a
path to citizenship, for some three million undocumented migrants, the vast majority
of which are of Hispanic origin. The socio-economic characteristics of these migrants
differed systematically to those of the native-born population. I therefore posit that
these migrants are more likely to vote in Hispanic officials on account of their ability
to better represent their interests, an effect which I expect to be the strongest in and
around 1992 when IRCA documented migrants began to naturalise.
I utilise a difference-in-difference regression framework in order to estimate the
gradient of legal status on the number of Hispanics in publicly elected office in a
given county in a given year. The trends in the number of Hispanics elected to pub-
lic office exhibit no distinguishable difference in treated and non-treated counties in
the two periods prior to the passage of the IRCA in 1986, suggesting that geograph-
ical considerations with respect to the counties affected by the IRCA play little to no
role in Hispanic selection to public office. This allows me to identify the difference-
in-difference estimation which reveals a clear pattern: counties with larger shares of
documented migrants experience positive and significant increases in the number of
Hispanic persons holding public office from that same county, an effect that is am-
plified in counties with a larger pre-1986 stock of the population that is of Hispanic
origin. Decomposing the data further reveals that the result is driven almost entirely
by stronger representation at the local level, in particular school board officials and
mayors. The point estimates are robust to alternative specifications and samples and
to the inclusion of various socio-economic controls.
The timing of the effect reveals further patterns that suggest the result is driven
by the voting potential of the newly documented migrants. By and large, but with no-
table exceptions, only citizens can vote in the United States.2 Consistent with this fact,
2Legal permanent residents can, and have been able to in the past, vote in some local and municipal
elections in the United States This was especially the case before the passage of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 which subsequently restricted the right to
vote in state and local elections to citizens. New York City, for example, allowed legal permanent res-
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counties affected by the IRCA experience increases in the number of Hispanic elected
officials at the state and federal levels but only as of 1993, one year after the first batch
of IRCA documented migrants were eligible to vote owing to their naturalisation.
Disaggregating local officers into county, municipal and school board levels reveals a
clear positive effect for mayors of small cities beginning in 1992 and for school board
officials in 1991, consistent with the fact that some states allowed legal permanent res-
idents to vote in local school board elections. Given that the requirements to serve
these local offices are more often concerned with ability to reflect the diversity of the
community rather than they are with policy expertise, I take this as the first piece of
evidence to suggest that representation, rather than pure competence, is driving the
result.
To better understand to what extent Hispanic selection is driven by candidate
competence, I decompose the data in order to examine the differential impact of the
IRCA on Hispanic officials elected to state and local judgeships, a unique feature of
the United States judiciary. Although the requirements to serve as judge vary, in gen-
eral they are rather demanding and include, among other things, having a law degree
and several years of professional experience as an attorney. These are characteristics
that correlate strongly with measures of competence employed in the literature. If
selection is driven by competence considerations alone, it is not unreasonable to ex-
pect an increase in the number of Hispanic judges in those areas most affected by the
IRCA. To this end, I find no discernible effect for elected judges at any level. This
finding, combined with the fact that the increase in elected officials is largest for local
school board officials and mayors of small cities, suggests that representation rather
than pure competence is the main driver of Hispanic selection to public office.
This study contributes to enhancing our understanding of the process of politi-
cal selection. This scholarship began in earnest after Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and
Besley and Coate (1997) articulated an alternative framework to that put forward by
Downs (1957) for understanding policy credibility, convergence and candidate selec-
tion (Besley, 2005). This literature includes theoretical and empirical work that has
helped us to better understand, among other things, the quality of public officials
(Caselli and Morelli, 2004), what attracts high quality types to public office (Ferraz
and Finan, 2009), the effects of high quality leaders on economic growth (Besley, Mon-
talvo and Reynal-Querol, 2011) and to what extent it is possible to select leaders that
are both of high quality and representative of a wide cross-section of society (Dal Bó
idents to vote in local school board elections from 1969 to 2002 and Chicago and a number of cities in
Maryland allowed non-citizens to vote in a range of local elections. In the present day, three states allow
legal permanent residents to vote in local and municipal elections and ten allow such residents to vote
in special district and municipal elections.
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et al., 2017) or of distinct groups (Besley et al., 2017). The question of politician identity
has also received attention within the citizen-candidate framework. Pande (2003) and
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), for example, both consider the impact of political
reservation for minority groups—scheduled castes and women, respectively—on pol-
icy outcomes in India. They find that stronger political representation of these groups
leads to an allocation of public resources that positively affects those groups. In this
chapter, I consider, in the absence of mandated political reservation, what factors en-
able minority groups to gain stronger political representation in the first place.
The paper also adds to the literature that aims at understanding the conse-
quences franchise extension. The majority of these studies aim at testing models put
forward by the likes of Downs (1957) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) and have ad-
vanced our understanding of the effects, on the level and distribution of public spend-
ing, of extending franchise to such groups as women Miller (2008); African Americans
(Cascio and Washington, 2014); young people (Bertocchi et al., 2017); lesser-educated
citizens (Fujiwara, 2015) and undocumented migrants (Sabet and Winter, 2019). It
adds to these studies by considering not so much the economic consequence of fran-
chise extension but its impact on the identity of those who run for public office.
Finally, this chapter utilises variation in legal status arising from the 1986 IRCA
in order to understand the impact of legal status on political representation. Accord-
ingly, the study also contributes to scholarship that documents the economic and so-
cial consequences of legal status. The majority of these studies examine the positive
impacts of acquiring legal status on the social and economic outcomes of the indi-
vidual migrant, including employment, wages and education (Kossoudji and Cobb-
Clark, 2002; Pan, 2012; Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak, 2011; Cortes, 2013) but also on
more aggregate outcomes such as crime (Baker, 2015). To my knowledge, this is the
first study to relate legal status with the question of political representation.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: in Section 3.2, I provide a brief
account of the IRCA. To carry out this study, I digitised a novel source of data that
contains information on Hispanic officials elected to public office from the local to
the federal level. In Section 3.3, I describe this and other data used in the study. I
outline my econometric methodology and present my results Sections 3.4 and 3.5 and
I conclude in Section 3.6.
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3.2. Background
3.2.1 The Immigration Reform and Control Act
As explained in greater detail in Sabet and Winter (2019), the 1986 Immigration Re-
form and Control Act (IRCA) is the most comprehensive piece of legislation the United
States government has put forward in order to address the question of undocumented
immigration. The purpose of the bill, which was signed into law in November 1986
by the Reagan Administration, was to restrict the inflow of undocumented migrants.
It did so through three main mechanisms: an employer sanctions provision that made
it illegal for employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers, increased fund-
ing for border security to discourage new people from migrating illegally and an
amnesty programme intended to legalise various unauthorized workers (Chishti and
Kamasaki, 2014).
The amnesty provision of the IRCA is generally regarded as the most successful
component of the law. It enabled undocumented migrants to apply for legal status
from May 1987 until November 1988, depending on the circumstances of the person
applying.3 On acceptance of their application, applicants were given temporary legal
status under the title of Temporary Resident Aliens which could last for as long as 18
months. During this time, their applications would be further processed and upon
successful completion of an English test and a civics test, applicants were given per-
manent resident status. Five years after permanent residency, these migrants were
eligible for naturalisation.
At the time of the Act, there were some 3 million undocumented immigrants
residing in the United States, corresponding to nearly 1 percent of the population
(Wasem, 2012; Baker, 2015) and the IRCA enjoyed near universal take-up (Baker,
2015). As detailed in Sabet and Winter (2019), the vast majority of these migrants
were of Mexican origin, economically active and healthy. Although not wealthy, those
documented by the IRCA earned, by and large, somewhere between the poverty rate
and median income levels (Sabet and Winter, 2019). As to education: 40 percent of
the IRCA applicants report having completed high school or more in 1989. The com-
parable figure for the population as a whole in 1990 stood at 75 percent.4 Given that
3The IRCA provided paths to legalisation and naturalisation for two groups of unauthorized workers:
Legally Authorized Workers (LAWs), which enabled undocumented immigrants who resided in the
country for an uninterrupted period from before 1 January 1982 to legalise (DHHS (December 1991),
Cascio and Lewis (2018)), and Special Agricultural Workers (SAWs) which allowed applications from
unauthorized migrants who could show that they carried out 90 days of work on select USDA defined
seasonal crops in the year leading to 1 May 1986 (DHHS (December 1991); Cascio and Lewis (2018)).
LAW applicants were eligible to apply from May 1987 to May 1988 whereas SAW applicants from 1 June
1987 to 30 November 1988 (DHHS, December 1991).
4The educational attainment of the IRCA migrants comes from the Legalisation Population Survey
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income and education are two measures of competence employed in the literature
on political selection, these characteristics are useful to bear in mind when consider-
ing the question of whether Hispanic selection to public office is driven by candidate
competence or his or her ability to better represent Hispanic interests.
The timing of the IRCA’s passage in 1986 was unexpected. Legislation to ad-
dress undocumented migration began in earnest after 1964 when the Bracero program—
a guest worker program that the United States negotiated with Mexico in 1942—was
terminated and since which time undocumented migration to the United States be-
came an issue. Congress even attempted to sign comprehensive legislation a number
of times but always failed (Chishti and Kamasaki, 2014). The prospects of the 1986
IRCA were also uncertain. Fuchs (1990), for example, reports that just days before
the IRCA passed, “congressional leaders pronounced it dead, this time after more
than fifteen months of hearings, legislative negotiations and debate”. Reinforcing this
notion, Representative Daniel E. Lungren (R-California) remarked on the day of the
bill’s passage that the IRCA was “a corpse going to the morgue, and on the way to the
morgue a toe began to twitch and we started CPR again” (Fuchs, 1990).
The geographic distribution of IRCA documented migrants may pose a greater
cause for concern. If, for example, undocumented migrants are concentrated in coun-
ties with larger Hispanic populations where the likelihood of a Hispanic running for
office is greater, then the effect may reflect other, omitted factors rather than that of
legal status on the ethnic identity of public officials. In this respect, the pre-trends are
informative. Although the roughly 300 IRCA-affected counties differ with respect to
certain observable characteristics to the rest of the counties in the country, as shown
in Table 3.1, these two county types exhibit no discernible difference in trends with
respect to the number of Hispanics in public office in the two years leading up to the
passage of the IRCA in 1986. This is made clear in Figure 3.1 which plots the total
number of Hispanic public officials in counties affected by the IRCA as compared to
those unaffected by the IRCA, as it appears in the raw data.5
Public Use File which surveyed 6,193 of the migrants legalised by the IRCA. The educational figures for
the United States population are from the 2000 Census Atlas of the United States. Chapter 10 of that
Atlas reports on education and it can be found online: https://bit.ly/2jjoVBb. Accessed 7 March 2019.
5In the regressions, I use a log scale for this outcome. I therefore plot the same figure but using a
log-scale in order to visualise the pre-trends. The result is shown Figure 1 and indicates little difference
to the linear scale.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Hispanics in elected public office by county type
Note: This graph plots the number of Hispanics in elected public office in counties affected by the IRCA
as compared to those counties unaffected by the IRCA.
Source: NALEO’s National Roster of Hispanic Elected Officials
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Table 3.1: Balance Table: Treated v. Untreated Counties in 1984
Treated Untreated Difference
Mean S.D Counties Mean S.D Counties Mean S.D
NALEO Officers:
Total Naleo Officers 4.21 [17.1] 328 0.67 [3.90] 1890 3.54*** (0.45)
Total Naleo Elected 0.38 [1.55] 328 0.11 [0.79] 1890 0.26*** (0.056)
Total Naleo Appointed 0.15 [1.44] 328 0.0011 [0.046] 1890 0.15*** (0.033)
County Characteristics:
Unemployment Rate 7.98 [1.84] 328 7.98 [2.27] 1890 -0.00078 (0.13)
Poverty Rate 11.9 [5.85] 328 16.8 [7.48] 1890 -4.94*** (0.43)
Population (1000) 399.0 [617.1] 328 32.1 [30.0] 1890 366.8*** (14.3)
Log of County Income 9.53 [0.19] 328 9.29 [0.18] 1890 0.24*** (0.011)
Log of Total Crime, Per Capita -3.36 [0.64] 328 -3.67 [0.73] 1890 0.31*** (0.043)
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3.3. Data
3.3.1 Legalised Migrants
The independent variable of interest is a measure of the number of IRCA applicants
per 1,000 county inhabitants in the United States for the period between 1984 and
1994. In the treated counties (i.e. those counties that received at least 1 application for
legal status), this value ranged from as little as .04 to as many as 50 applications per
1,000 county inhabitants. These data come from Baker (2015) who, in turn, takes it
from the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS). I also take from Baker (2015)
measures of county poverty, unemployment, population and income which I use as
control variables.
3.3.2 Hispanic Public Officials: The NALEO Roster
The goal of the analysis is to understand whether legalising, and eventually enfran-
chising, migrants of a particular group bears any influence on their representation
in politics, as measured by the number of persons of that particular group elected
to public office. To measure the impact of legal status on this outcome, I digitised a
novel source of data taken from the historical archives of the National Association of
Latino Elected and Appointed Officers (NALEO), a non-profit, non-partisan organi-
sation which has, among other things, gathered data on Hispanic persons elected to
public office from the local to the federal level since 1984. NALEO has been track-
ing this data in two waves: from 1984 to 1994 through the National Roster of Hispanic
Elected Officials and, following a change in methodology, from 1996 to present day
through the National Directory of Latino Elected Officials. The present study digitised
the early archive records of the Roster. I generate a dataset of over 43,000 individual
officials in this time period that contains information on the level of office served, the
title of the role, the political affiliation of the official, his or her gender and, perhaps
most importantly, their address. I use ZIP code information of each officer in order
to generate county-level aggregates of the total number of Hispanic public officials
in a given county in a given year. County officers are aggregated to the county in
which they serve whereas federal, state and municipal officers are aggregated to the
county to which their ZIP code corresponds. Thus, for example, State Representative
for Arizona Carmen Cajero (1986, DEM) is coded under Pima County because that
is the county in which her ZIP code falls. It is not the case that all state and federal
representatives have ZIP codes that correspond to the counties where their respec-
tive state capitols are located. Carmen Cajero serves as a case in point. She serves
as a state representative for Arizona but is based out of Pima County, not Maricopa
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County where Phoenix, the state capitol, is located. The more than 600 counties across
which the Hispanic officials are distributed contain, on average, 11 officials, some of
which contain just one officer and some of which contain more than 100.
NALEO collects its information via survey. It begins with a mailed question-
naire to its current and past members which ranges from 2,500 individuals in 1984 to
over 5,000 in 1994. In addition, NALEO identifies potential Hispanic office holders
by surveying state directories, membership lists of national and state organisations,
Who’s Who in American Politics and Election Results Directories. In some years, NA-
LEO retained a national press clipping service to identify news articles that report on
Hispanics newly elected to public office. All newly identified persons, as well as those
who did not respond to the initial questionnaire, were followed up through an exten-
sive telephone verification process. Each year, NALEO undertakes over 5,000 phone
calls to verify Hispanic officials who assume public office. In addition, NALEO has
benefited from Census data. In 1987 and 1992, the Census Bureau prepared its Pop-
ularly Elected Officials reports. These reports identify elected officials across all levels
of government in the United States and provide a breakdown by race. In these years,
the Census Bureau provided NALEO with a breakdown of governments where His-
panics occupied public office and a handful of new officers were identified as a result.
However, these officers were almost exclusively at the special district level and did
not affect NALEO’s estimates for other types of office. As such, the NALEO Roster is
the most comprehensive source of information on Hispanics elected to public office.
Trends in Hispanic officials
Figure 3.2 shows the overall trend in the number of Hispanics entering public office
over the period of the sample from 1984 to 1994. As shown, in the years before 1988,
there is modest growth in the number of such officials: from some 3,100 in total across
the United States to approximately 3,300 in 1988. Thereafter, however, there is an
appreciable increase to some 5,400 in 1994.
Race and public office
Whilst the trend in Hispanic officials in office is increasing, especially after 1988, the
relative number of Hispanics in office is still relatively few. The 1992 and 1987 editions
of the Popularly Elected Officials reports prepared by the Census Bureau note that there
were 85,006 governments at all levels in the United States comprising 513,200 officials
in 1992 and 83,236 governments with 497,697 officials in 1987. Of these officials, 96.7
and 97.5 percent in 1992 and 1987, respectively, were white. In both cases, less than 1
percent of locally elected officials were of Hispanic origin.
CHAPTER 3. LEGAL STATUS AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 107
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
To
ta
l N
AL
EO
 O
ffic
ial
s, 
10
00
s
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
Year
Figure 3.2: Total number of Hispanics in elected public office
Note: This graph shows the total number of Hispanics in elected public office at all levels of government
across the entire United States.
Source: NALEO’s National Roster of Hispanic Elected Officials
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Figure 3.3: Hispanic elected officials at the local level
Note: This graph illustrates the breakdown among the 80 percent of Hispanic public officials that serve
at the local level.
Source: NALEO’s National Roster of Hispanic Elected Officials
Gender
The Census reports indicate that the majority of public officials are male: 76 and 80
percent in 1992 and 1987, respectively. The NALEO figures are comparable: on aver-
age, 79 percent of the NALEO public officials are men.
Levels of office
The Census reports indicate that the vast majority of elected officers—over 95 percent
in both 1992 and 1987—serve local levels of government. The same is true of the offi-
cers contained in the NALEO Rosters. The data indicate that 80 percent of all Hispanic
officials serve in local branches of government. Breaking this down further, as shown
in Figure 3.3, reveals that the majority of these individuals serve as school board or
municipal officials. This is perhaps unsurprising as these lower levels of office are
typically considered as the first rung on the ladder of political power.
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Political affiliation
The NALEO Roster contains information on political affiliation for 40,572 of the 43,000
officers. Of these, 56 percent are independent or non-partisan whilst 40 percent are
registered Democrats. The remaining four percent are registered Republicans.
3.4. Immigrant Legalisation and Hispanic Officials
3.4.1 Testing for Pre-Trends
I begin the formal analysis by plotting the coefficient, β j, of the event-study model
specified in equation 3.1 in order to visualise the difference in trends between treated
and non-treated counties with respect to the number of Hispanics in elected public
office.
log(y + 1)c,t = δc + αt +
1994
∑
j=1984
β j
[
Tc × Djt
]
+ ec,t (3.1)
Here, y denotes the number of Hispanics in elected public office in county c in
year t. Tc is a binary variable set to one if a county received one or more applications
for legal status post-1986 and zero otherwise; and Djt is a dummy set to one when t = j
(∀ j 6= 1986). I control for county-specific time-invariant characteristics through the
inclusion of county fixed effects, δc, and I likewise account for any time-varying shocks
by including year fixed effects, αt. The error term is expressed as ec,t which I cluster at
the county level. The results are shown in Figure 3.4 and indicate that the difference
in the number of Hispanic elected officials is not significantly different for treated and
non-treated counties prior to 1986, thus rendering the identifying assumption of the
model plausible.
3.4.2 Baseline Estimates
Next, I control for county population, income, poverty and unemployment rates indi-
cated by Xc,t in equations 3.2 and 3.3. In equation 3.2, I measure the difference between
treated and non-treated counties by interacting Tc with an indicator, Pt, that is one if
t ≥ 1986 and zero otherwise. In equation 3.3, I estimate the impact of treatment inten-
sity by exploiting the cumulative number of legalisations per 1,000 county inhabitants
(plus one), as expressed by ln(IRCA + 1)c,t. In both estimations, I replace year fixed
effects with state-by-year fixed effects, ζst, to capture any state specific, time-varying
shocks that may confound the analysis.
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Figure 3.4: Coefficient on treatment for the number of Hispanics in public office
Note: This graph plots the regression coefficient on a treatment indicator when it is interacted with year
dummies as specified in equation 3.1. The outcome is the number of Hispanics in elected public office
in a given county in a given year. The regression includes no controls but includes county fixed effects
and state-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Confidence intervals are
drawn at 95 percent. N = 24,358.
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ln(y + 1)c,t = β0 + δc + ζst + β1 · (Tc × Pt) +Θ·Xc,t + ec,t (3.2)
ln(y + 1)c,t = β0 + δc + ζst + β1 · ln(IRCA + 1)c,t +Θ·Xc,t + ec,t (3.3)
Results are shown in Table 3.2 and indicate a positive and statistically significant
relationship. Panel A shows the estimated coefficient for β1 when using a treatment
indicator as shown in equation 3.2 whereas Panel B shows the same estimate when
using treatment intensity as shown in equation 3.3. Column 1 shows the baseline ef-
fect: counties affected by the IRCA experience, on average, a 3.6 percent increase in
the number of Hispanics in elected public office; measuring using treatment intensity,
the result in Panel B indicates that a one percent increase in per capita legalisations
at the county level is associated with a 0.058 percent increase in the number of His-
panics in office. Increasing the number of per capita legalisations from the 25th to the
75th percentile, this elasticity translates into an increase in the number of Hispanics in
public office of around 26 percent.
In Column 2, I restrict the sample to those counties with populations less than
the average population size (of the treated counties) in order to rule out the possi-
bility that the effect is driven by a handful of large sanctuary cities. The results on
this restricted sample are nearly the same as those of the baseline, indicating that very
populous cities are not driving the effect. In Column 3, I return to the potential ge-
ographic endogeneity associated with where the IRCA migrants settle. I carry out a
propensity score match in order to identify the most comparable control county for
each treated county.6 For this test, I drop the state-year fixed effects to allow for the
possibility that the best-matched control county for a given treated county may, in
fact, lie in a different state.7 The results here are encouraging: not only are they pre-
cisely estimated, but they are also larger than before thus suggesting that, if anything,
the baseline results may, in fact, be underestimating the size of the true relationship.
Finally, in Column 4, I conduct a first differences estimation using only two time pe-
riods in the sample: 1984 and 1994. Skipping the intervening years allows me to (a)
account for any issues that might arise with respect to IRCA application processing
times and (b) compare one period before the passage of the IRCA with a period when
many IRCA documented migrants were not only legalised but naturalised and, hence,
enfranchised. Comparing treated and non-treated counties only in the first and last
year of the sample only strengthens the results: it increases the magnitude of the coef-
6I match using the nearest neighbour when the propensity score is calculated on the basis of county
population, income, poverty and unemployment rates as well as the per capita crime rate in 1984.
7Matching within a state and leaving state-year fixed effects in makes no difference to the result.
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Table 3.2: NALEO Officials and the IRCA
Outcome: Log Number of Hispanic Elected Officials + 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Pop ≤ 428, 000 Matching ∆y1994-1984
Panel A. Treatment Indicator
Treatment × Post 0.0362∗∗ 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.0637∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0136) (0.0227) (0.0241)
Panel B. Treatment Intensity
Log legalisations 0.0582∗∗∗ 0.0505∗∗∗ 0.0827∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0176) (0.0221)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 25,699 24,690 7,056 4,162
Number of Counties 2,624 2,534 656 2,081
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the number of Hispanic individuals in elected
public office in a given county in a given year (plus one). Panel A shows results when using
a treatment indicator whereas Panel B shows results when using a measure of treatment
intensity which is the log of the cumulative number of IRCA applications from a given county
in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). Control variables include poverty
and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county
level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
ficients and, in the case of Panel A, increases the precision with which it is estimated.
3.4.3 Robustness Checks
In Table 3.3, I undertake a number of empirical checks to test the strength of the rela-
tionship uncovered in the baseline estimations. These include lagging the explanatory
variable by one or two years, as shown in Columns 1 and 2, and using the 1980 pop-
ulation as a basis for the per capita legalised calculation as shown in Column 3. The
number of Hispanic officials elected to public office in a given county is likely to be in-
fluenced by the size of two key demographic populations: potential voters and those
of Hispanic origin. To rule out mechanical increases in the number of Hispanic offi-
cials that might arise as a result of these factors, I control for the share of the county
population that is (a) over 18 and (b) of Hispanic origin in Column 4. The results
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remain robust to the inclusion of these characteristics.8 In Column 5, I try to better
understand the interaction between the Hispanic population of a given county and
the IRCA. I therefore interact the number of per capita legalisations with the 1980
Hispanic population. The baseline effect of the 1980 Hispanic population cannot be
estimated owing to county fixed effects. However, the rest of the interaction is in-
formative: the baseline effect of the IRCA switches sign and loses its precision but
its interaction with the Hispanic population is positive and significant, suggesting a
dynamic interaction between the two: IRCA migrants have a stronger effect on the
number of Hispanics elected to public office the larger the pre-existing Hispanic stock
of the population, perhaps pointing to network effects at work.9
Finally, the reader may wonder to what extent the results are sensitive to the
logarithmic transformation of the data, especially when so many counties have zero
legalisations or Hispanic elected officials. To this end, I replicate the results of Table
3.2 but using a linear scale for both the dependent and independent variable. As
shown in Table 1, the results are positive and precisely estimated. Like in Sabet and
Winter (2019), I opt for a log− log specification because both variables are unevenly
distributed and because an elasticity is, in this case, easier for interpretation. Together,
these results demonstrate that the relationship between legal status and the number
of Hispanics assuming public office is a robust one.
8This is consistent with the fact that the IRCA did not lead to an increase in county population but
instead a change in legal status of the already resident population. This is because population calcula-
tions are inclusive of the undocumented population. Undocumented migrants in the United States is an
estimate based on the difference between the census population count, which includes everyone, and the
legally resident foreign-born population which is kept by the Immigration and Naturalisation Services
(INS) (Baker and Rytina, 2013).
9The results are also robust to more conservative approaches to inference. Clustering standard errors
at the state level does not change the precision of the estimate (unreported).
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Table 3.3: Robustness Checks
Outcome: Log Number of Hispanic Public Officials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
x− 1 x− 2 1980 PC Extra Controls Hispanic Population
Log legalisationst−1 0.0571∗∗∗
(0.0161)
Log legalisationst−2 0.0469∗∗∗
(0.0168)
Log legalisations 0.0495∗∗∗ -0.128
(0.0161) (0.105)
IRCA per 1980 capita, Log 0.0532∗∗∗
(0.0148)
Log legalisations × Log of 1980 Hisp. Pop 0.0184∗
(0.0108)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No No Yes No
Observations 22,507 19,520 22,552 25,699 25,699
Number of Counties 2,561 2,491 2,213 2,624 2,624
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the number of Hispanic individuals in elected public office in a given county in a given
year (plus one). Log legalisations is the log of the cumulative number of IRCA legalised migrants in a given county in a given
year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log
of income, all aggregated to the county level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.5. Heterogeneity Analysis
The richness of the NALEO data enables me to conduct a more refined analysis. In
this section, I investigate whether there is a differential effect for officers serving at
different levels of public office and I try to gain insight into the timing of the effect. I
also try to understand to what extent Hispanic selection to public office is driven on
account of a candidate’s competence as opposed to his or her ability to better represent
the interests of the Hispanic population.
3.5.1 Office Type
NALEO officers occupy a range of office types, from county and municipal officers,
which include county executives, mayors and city councillors all the way to members
of Congress.10 To investigate whether there is a differential impact on the number of
Hispanics entering a specific office type, I estimate β1 from equation 3.4:
ln(y + 1)o,c,t = β0 + δc + ζst + β1 · ln(IRCA + 1)c,t +Θ·Xc,t + ec,t (3.4)
Where the outcome variable is the log of the number of Hispanics in elected
public office o in county c in year t (plus one) and all other variables are as previously
defined. The results are shown in Figure 3.5. Whilst the overall effect is positive
and significant, Figure 3.5 reveals interesting heterogeneities. The effects are largest
for more localised and less politicised levels of office.11 For example, the effect of
legal status on the number of Hispanics entering office is the largest for school board
officers (school board members, chairs, presidents, trustees) and municipal officers
(mayors and city councillors) and whereas there is little to no effect for state level
officers and a modest effect for federal members of congress.12 This suggests that legal
status has a significant impact on the ethnic composition of holders of public office but
that this effect is most strongly felt at the local level.13 To the extent that these higher
offices correlate with more policy competence, as measured in the literature, these
10The only exception is that of State Governors. There are only two in the sample: Bob Martinez of
Florida who served until 1990 and Toney Anaya of New Mexico who served until 1986. Because of the
fewness of NALEO Governors, I am unable to estimate the effect of the IRCA on this particular type of
office.
11I omit special district officials from these regressions because, as shown in Figure 3.3, NALEO did
not collect data on these officials prior to 1986.
12I group all the federal, state and local officers, respectively, and regress these on the number of per
capita legalisations in a county. The results are shown in Figure 2 and indicate that the effect is largest at
the local levels.
13The judicial officers of Figure 3.5 include not just judges but also county sheriffs, town marshals,
constables, police chiefs and other such officers.
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Figure 3.5: Regression coefficients: The IRCA and Hispanic public officials by office
type
Note: This graph plots the regression coefficient on the log number of per capita legalisations (plus one)
as specified in equation 3.4. The outcome variable is the log number of Hispanics serving a particular
office type (denoted on the x-axis) in a given county in a given year (plus one). Control variables include
poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county
level. The regressions also include county fixed effects and state-year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level. Confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent. N = 25,699 for all regressions.
results may also suggest that stronger representation in local matters is what drives
Hispanic selection to public office.
3.5.2 Timing of the Effect
As a next step, I decompose the timing of the effect for elected officials to test the
plausibility of the voting channel. Non-citizen voting in the United States has a long
history. Up until the 1920s, 22 states allowed non-citizens to vote in local, state and
even national elections (Raskin, 1992). In more recent times, the ability of non-citizens
to vote in federal and state elections has been curtailed since 1996 and the enactment
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) which
criminalised non-citizen voting in such elections with penalties including fines, im-
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prisonment and even deportation. However, the text of the law makes clear that
“aliens are authorized to vote for such other purpose under a State constitution or
statute or a local ordinance”.14 As such, there is some heterogeneity—even in present
day—as to which states allow non-citizens to vote in local elections. At present, for
example, a number of municipalities in Maryland, the cities of Chicago and San Fran-
cisco and the cities of Cambridge and Amherst in Massachusetts allow non-citizens to
vote in local elections (Kini, 2005) while New York City allowed non-citizens to vote in
local school board elections from 1968 to 2002 (Kini, 2005). The point is that while the
majority of elections in the United States require citizenship, there are notable cases of
non-citizen voting, especially at the local level. That the coefficient on legal status is
largest for locally elected Hispanic public officials—a large number of which comprise
school board officials—reflects this fact.
To better understand the timing of the effect, I plot β j in Figure 3.6 after esti-
mating it in the equation given by 3.5. Here, the outcome is the universe of Hispanic
elected officials in county c in year t serving at level l where l represents officers at the
local, state and federal levels.
log(y + 1)l,c,t = δc + ζst +
1994
∑
j=1984
β j
[
Tc × Djt
]
+Θ·Xc,t + ec,t (3.5)
As shown in Figure 3.6, the coefficient on treatment for federal and state elected
officials—that is, members of Congress, state representatives, state executives and
state senators—is positive and precisely estimated only as of 1993 for federal officials
and only in 1994 for state officials. This is consistent with the fact that documented
migrants become relevant in such elections only after 1992 when they are eligible for
citizenship and enfranchisement.
Interestingly, the coefficient on treatment for locally elected officials is not pre-
cisely estimated. I thus decompose these results further and estimate β j when con-
sidering county, municipal and school board officials separately. The results are pre-
sented in Figure 3.7 and indicate the strongest effect for local school board members.
Here, the pre-trends are flat and indicate virtually no difference in the number of His-
panics in school board positions in treated and non-treated counties prior to the IRCA
and a sharp increase beginning in 1991, a year before eligibility for citizenship. Given
that a number of states allow non-citizens to vote in such elections, the timing of the
effect seems consistent with the idea that the result is driven by the voting poten-
tial of the IRCA documented migrants. Moreover, there are typically no professional
or academic requirements to running for local school boards; instead, such positions
1418 U.S.C §611 - Voting by Aliens.
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Figure 3.6: Regression coefficients: The IRCA and Hispanics in elected office over
time
Note: This graph plots the regression coefficient on a treatment indicator when it is interacted with year
dummies as specified in equation 3.5. The outcome variable is the log number of Hispanics serving in
an elected role at different levels of government (excluding elected judgeships) in a given county in a
given year (plus one). Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population
and log of income, all aggregated to the county level. The regressions also include county fixed effects
and state-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Confidence intervals are
drawn at 95 percent. N = 24,358 for all regressions.
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Figure 3.7: Regression coefficients: The IRCA and Hispanic local officials over time
Note: This graph plots the regression coefficient on a treatment indicator when it is interacted with year
dummies as specified in equation 3.5 but only for those officers serving at the local level. The outcome
variable is the log number of Hispanics serving in an elected role at the county, municipal or school
board level (plus one). Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population
and log of income, all aggregated to the county level. The regressions also include county fixed effects
and state-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Confidence intervals are
drawn at 95 percent. N = 24,358 for all regressions.
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often require candidates to be diverse and as representative of the community as pos-
sible. In this respect, the National School Boards Association of the United States
explains that “[s]chool board members, especially those in large districts, are more
representative of the communities they serve than state legislatures and members of
Congress.”15 I take this as initial evidence that representation, rather than competence
alone, is driving the result.
There is also a modest effect for municipal officials, a large number of whom
are mayors. I therefore estimate the treatment effect over time separately for Hispanic
mayors, as shown in the bottom-right panel of Figure 3.7 and find strong results. The
coefficient on treatment both increases in size and becomes precisely estimated as of
1992, coinciding with the first year when IRCA migrants were eligible to vote in such
elections. Because I lack data on the individual characteristics of the officials, I can-
not test whether the Hispanic mayors who enter office in IRCA counties after 1986
differ in their socio-economic characteristics to those who assumed office before 1986.
I therefore cannot say whether these mayors are chosen on account of their particu-
lar competence or their ability to better represent Hispanic interests. But, like school
board officials, the formal requirements to run as a mayor do not involve certain pro-
fessional or educational qualifications. Moreover, the Hispanic mayors in the data
serve cities with populations of less than 300,000 where, it may be argued, an ability
to represent the community may count for more than just policy expertise.16
3.5.3 Competence
In this subsection, I endeavour to understand what role competence plays in explain-
ing the increase in Hispanic officials assuming public office as a result of the IRCA.
A candidate’s competence is usually proxied by measures of individual income, edu-
cation, age and occupational status (Besley et al., 2017). Lacking this information my
data, I am unable to test whether the Hispanic officials who enter office post-1986 in
IRCA-affected counties differ systematically in their socio-economic characteristics to
those who enter office prior to the IRCA. However, a peculiarity of the institutional
context of the United States does allow me to carry out an indirect test for the com-
petence channel: elected judges. Although qualifications do differ from state to state,
most have relatively stringent requirements. In Texas, to take but one example, Judges
from the county level to the state level are elected. At the county level, qualification
for judicial office includes being a US citizen, at least 25 years of age, resident of that
15Taken from the Website of the NSBA: https://bit.ly/2xn7pyb. Accessed 7 March 2019.
16In fact, the effect vanishes when restricting the sample to counties with populations of more than
300,000.
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Table 3.4: Elected Officials v. Elected Judges
Outcome: Log Number of Hispanic Elected Officials
(1) (2)
Elected Officials Elected Judges
Log legalisations 0.0186∗∗ 0.00920
(0.00798) (0.00560)
Control Variables Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 25,699 25,699
Number of Counties 2,624 2,624
Notes: The dependent variable is the log number of Hispanic individuals elected to public
office in a given county in a given year (plus one). In Column 1 this includes the universe
of all elected officials that are not judges. In Column 2 this includes only elected judges.
Log legalisations is the log of the cumulative number of IRCA legalised migrants in
a given county in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). Control variables
include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all ag-
gregated to the county level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the
county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
particular county for at least two years and a licensed attorney who has practised law
or served as a judge for four years.17 Although some lower level judges have less
exacting qualifications, candidates who run for elected judges are likely to correlate
with higher measures of competence as used in the literature. Accordingly, in Column
1 of Table 3.4, I regress the legalisation variable against the total number of Hispanic
elected officials from a given county in a given year, excluding elected judges. In Col-
umn 2, I carry out a similar exercise but use only elected judges from the NALEO Ros-
ter as my outcome variable of interest. The coefficient indicates that areas with higher
numbers of documented migrants experience a greater number of elected officials but
not elected judges. Given that the elected effect for non-judgeships is strongest for
local school board officials and mayors of small cities and that there is no effect for
elected judges, I conclude that Hispanic selection is being driven by factors other than
just candidate competence.
To ensure that the coefficient in Column 2 is not hiding heterogeneities with
respect to time or level of judgeship, I disaggregate elected judges at the state and
local levels and plot the corresponding regression coefficients on a treatment indica-
17Taken from the Website of the Texas Judicial Branch: https://bit.ly/1T0JvRM. Accessed 6 March
2019.
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Figure 3.8: Regression coefficients: The IRCA and Hispanic elected judges over time
Note: This graph plots the regression coefficient on a treatment indicator when it is interacted with year
dummies. The outcome variable is the log number of Hispanic elected judges at different levels in a
given county in a given year (plus one). Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates, log
of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. Confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent. N = 24,358 for all three regressions.
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tor when it is interacted with year dummies as shown in Figure 3.8. As illustrated, a
county affected by the IRCA does not experience an appreciable increase in the num-
ber of Hispanic officials elected to judgeships after 1986, further reinforcing the notion
that the Hispanics that assume public office as a result of the IRCA are selected for rea-
sons other than just their competence.
3.6. Conclusion
Hispanics are the largest ethnic minority in the United States. Notwithstanding, His-
panic representation in politics is not reflective of their relative share in the popula-
tion. Accordingly, this chapter has sought to better understand some of the underly-
ing features of the institutional structure in the United States that determines who gets
elected to office and on what grounds. The explanation I proposed is in line with mod-
els of political selection that highlight a candidate’s ability to represent the interests of
a particular group as a key driver of selection.
The particular institutional feature that I studied more carefully is that of His-
panic immigrant legalisation and enfranchisement. The idea is that a sudden change
in the voting eligibility of a relatively homogeneous group of migrants of Hispanic
origin increases their relative power in choosing their representatives. Exploiting a
novel source of data that contains information on over 43,000 Hispanic public offi-
cials, I found that counties affected by the 1986 IRCA, in comparison with those un-
affected by it, experience a significant increase in the number of Hispanics elected to
public office after the passage of the law. The result is not confounded by geographical
considerations with respect to where the undocumented migrants settle and I showed
that the relationship remains robust to a number of empirical tests. I found, moreover,
that the baseline effect is amplified the larger the stock of the pre-1986 population that
is of Hispanic origin, suggesting strong network effects between new migrants and
existing ones when it comes to selecting public officials.
The data on Hispanic officials allowed me to uncover interesting heterogeneities.
In this respect, I found that counties affected by the IRCA experience greater numbers
of Hispanic officials assuming office at all levels of government, but that the effect is
strongest for locally elected public officials, in particular school board members and
mayors. Examining the timing of the effect, I found that the number of Hispanics in
office at the federal and state level increases significantly as of 1993 and at the local
level as of 1991, broadly consistent with the time when IRCA documented migrants
gained eligibility to vote via naturalisation, suggesting that the effect runs through
the voting potential of the newly documented migrants. Moreover, given that the
effect is strongest for local, less politicised offices that do not have professional or ed-
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ucational prerequisites, I took this as initial evidence that representation, rather than
competence alone, is driving the result.
In the final part of the paper, I examined to what extent Hispanic political se-
lection in this setting is driven by competence. In this connection, I exploited the
institutional feature of the United States that allows for many judges at the state and
local level to be elected. The intuition is that if competence is a very strong driver
of political selection, counties affected by the IRCA ought to experience an increase
in the number of Hispanic judges elected to office as the requirements of that office
correlate strongly with measures of competence typically employed in the literature.
My results, however, indicate no significant relationship between counties affected by
the IRCA and the number of Hispanic officials serving as elected judges. This finding,
combined with the fact that the effect is the largest for local school board officials and
mayors of small cities, leads me to conclude that the Hispanics that are selected to
public office as a result of the IRCA are selected not strictly on account of their educa-
tional qualifications and professional credentials but rather for their ability to better
represent Hispanic interests on local matters pertaining to schooling and education.
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Appendix C
C.1 Additional Figures
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Figure 1: Number of Hispanics in elected public office (log scale) by county type
Note: This graph plots the log of the number of Hispanics in elected public office in counties affected by
the IRCA as compared to those counties unaffected by the IRCA.
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Figure 2: Regression coefficients: The IRCA and Hispanic public officials by levels of
office
Note: This graph plots the regression coefficient on the log number of per capita legalisations (plus
one) when the outcome variable is the log number of Hispanics in elected public office at the federal,
state and local levels as well as on the total number of Hispanic elected officials at all levels (plus one).
Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all
aggregated to the county level. The regressions also include county fixed effects and state-year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent.
N = 25,699 for all regressions.
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C.2 Additional Tables
Table 1: NALEO Officials and the IRCA using a Linear Scale
Outcome: Number of Hispanic Elected Officials
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Pop ≤ 428, 000 Matching ∆y1994-1984
Panel A. Treatment Indicator
Treatment × Post 1.157∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 2.194∗ 2.192∗∗∗
(0.457) (0.0982) (1.172) (0.730)
Panel B. Treatment Intensity
Legalisations per 1000 capita 0.342∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗ 0.587∗∗
(0.151) (0.0279) (0.175) (0.251)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 25,699 24,690 7,056 4,162
Number of Counties 2,624 2,534 656 2,081
Notes: The dependent variable is number of Hispanic individuals in elected public office in a
given county in a given year. Panel A shows results when using a treatment indicator whereas
Panel B shows results when using a measure of treatment intensity which is the cumulative
number of IRCA applications from a given county in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants.
Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of in-
come, all aggregated to the county level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered
at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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